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ABSTRACT 
 
“Fully Aware of the Power of Words”: 
Morality, Politics, and Law in the Rwandan “Media Trial”. (August 2012) 
Bradley Serber, B.A., University of Minnesota 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
Incitement to genocide is a fairly recent and elusive concept in international law. 
First used at Nuremberg, the concept did not reappear for more than fifty years, when the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) used it to convict and sentence three 
media executives: Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze. 
Using their trial as a case study, I use rhetorical analysis to help clarify both the concept 
of “incitement” and the role that morality, politics, and law play in genocide and its 
aftermath.  
This case study helps to explain some of the complexities that often accompany 
genocide. First, because incitement depends on one person’s words and another’s 
actions, the answer to the question of who is responsible for the final outcome is unclear. 
Second, because genocide affects, and is affected by, the decisions of both local and 
international communities, actions (not) taken by either affect one another in significant 
ways. Finally, in the aftermath of genocide, questions of culpability, punishment, and 
reconciliation complicate international law. Based on this case study, I suggest ways in 
which the international community might learn from what happened in Rwanda. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 To date, the legal concept of incitement to genocide has only appeared in two 
international trials. As a result, the concept and its application remain unclear. Lawyers, 
scholars, and those who have been affected directly by genocide continue to debate 
whether incitement is possible, and, if so, what constitutes incitement, whom to hold 
responsible for it, what actions can and should be taken to prevent it, and what the 
appropriate punishment for it should be.  
 Before looking at incitement in the context of genocide, however, it makes sense 
to look first at the concept generally. In the U.S., the concept that we know now as 
incitement evolved from the English Common law’s concept of bad tendency, which 
sought to curb potentially dangerous speech in its early stages. Over time, the Supreme 
Court has refined the concept through a few later iterations. In Schenck v. United States, 
for example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established the clear and present danger 
standard, which asserted the existence of “substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.”1 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court replaced clear and present 
danger with the current standard of incitement, which limits government action to cases 
in which “advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to produce such action.”2 With its emphasis on the likelihood of producing effects, 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 
                                                 
1 Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919). 
2 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). 
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the Brandenburg test significantly narrows the scope of words that qualify as incitement. 
 In addition to understanding the developmental history of incitement, reflections 
on the concept as a limit of free speech offer some food for thought. For example, in his 
dissent in Gitlow v. New York, Justice Holmes, who devised the idea of clear and 
present danger, argued that “every idea is an incitement.”3 In other words, to apply any 
kind of incitement test would necessarily be arbitrary and subjective. Given this history, 
the U.S. has been strongly protective of free speech and hesitant to punish anyone for 
incitement for a very long time.  
 Of course, the strong protection of free speech in the US makes its laws very 
different from those of other Western democracies and other countries around the world. 
Questions thus arise about how to handle incitement when it enters into international 
debates. These questions originally surfaced on an international level during the trial of 
Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher at Nuremberg.  They did not resurface again until 
more than fifty years later, when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda began 
to try major figures involved in the Rwandan genocide. In an effort to make sense of 
these questions, I explore the latter trial, the so-called “Media Trial” of three Rwandan 
media executives (Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze) 
for incitement to genocide. This trial, which began in 2001, was the first case of its kind 
in more than fifty years. Despite its many complications, the trial ultimately convicted 
                                                 
3 Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925). 
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all three men on counts of genocide, incitement to genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.4 
 However, as the many complications of this trial demonstrate, the process of 
finding, detaining, and prosecuting these men was anything but simple. First, all three of 
them fled the country after the genocide, and efforts to find and arrest them took a great 
amount of time, energy, and international cooperation.5 Second, even after they were 
captured, legal issues related to their detainment became grounds upon which they could 
challenge the court’s authority and appeal for their freedom. Finally, several 
complications with adjudication related to the struggle between local and international 
jurisdiction raise some tough questions about international law and genocide prevention.  
Consequently, this trial makes a good case study for testing international law and politics 
as it poses more questions than it answers.  
 With this in mind, I analyze the issues of morality, politics, and law involved in 
this trial.  The moral question here is one of media ethics, agency, and culpability. It asks 
if incitement is possible, and, if so, where the blame should lie for it. The second 
question, the question of politics, is primarily concerned with genocide prevention by the 
international community. It asks what the role and responsibilities of those outside of the 
direct context of the genocide should do once they have identified a possible case of 
incitement. Finally, the third question focuses on the international legal process. It asks 
                                                 
4 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T 
(2003). 
5 For that matter, their alleged co-conspirator, Félicien Kabuga, remains at large to this day. 
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who should be in charge of prosecuting those who are accused of incitement to genocide 
and what the appropriate legal consequences should be.  
 Of course, these dimensions—morality, politics, and law—are not mutually 
exclusive in each of these chapters. The political question of what uninvolved parties 
should do once they can identify a possible case of incitement is as much a moral 
question as the legal question of who should be in charge of trying accused criminals is 
political. Nevertheless, dividing my chapters this way makes logical sense as it 
simultaneously traces the beginning, middle, end, and aftermath of the genocide and 
moves from local to international concerns. 
 The morality chapter of this thesis will examine questions of agency and 
culpability in cases of incitement.  Whereas it might be tempting to view incitement as a 
relatively clean and basic cause-and-effect relationship, the reality is that it is not always 
so simple.  By definition, the concept of incitement implies a person or group who 
incites through words and a person or group who acts in response to those words.  
However, the mechanism by which this process occurs often eludes explanation.  For 
instance, it is often difficult to pin down why strong words lead to action in some 
situations and not others or to determine a priori which combination of words must be 
uttered in order to move people to action.   
 Questions of agency and culpability in cases of incitement can thus take many 
forms, depending how the concept is framed.  For instance, a view of incitement that 
describes the process as an inevitable cause-and-effect relationship from which the 
audience has no escape and no control might place the blame for actions heavily, if not 
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entirely, on the speaker.  At the other extreme, a view that concludes that words have 
little or no effect on the receivers of messages might place the blame for actions heavily, 
if not entirely, on the individual(s) who committed them.  Somewhere in between these 
views lie other perspectives that might share the blame (for instance, the view that 
individuals or groups might feel angry and vigilant but will not act unless they are 
provoked by strong words). Therefore, the concept of incitement is not as clean and 
simple as we sometimes would like to believe.  
 Further complicating this issue is the fact that different countries have taken 
different positions on questions of hate speech and incitement.  For example, the United 
States, which strongly protects the freedom of speech, views incitement differently from 
post-Nazi Germany, which, given its history, enforces stricter limits on hate speech.  
Accordingly, when questions of incitement warrant international attention, the 
international court must navigate the tension among competing speech codes. As a 
result, the manner in which the international court frames questions of agency and 
culpability matters.  For starters, it determines the extent to which politicians, media 
executives, and other leaders can be held accountable for their words.  Not only does the 
court’s position determine who can and cannot be prosecuted under international law, 
but it also sets legal precedent for future cases.  As a result, the letter and spirit of 
decisions that the court renders matter for the sake of legal arguments. Furthermore, 
having a clearly defined standard of incitement backed up with the threat of severe 
international legal consequences might serve as a deterrent to those who might desire to 
incite genocide in the future.   
 6 
 With all of this in mind, it makes sense to examine how the ICTR has dealt with 
questions of agency. In their indictments and rulings in the “Media Trial,” the court 
made some noteworthy claims about the power of language and the role of the media. 
For example, in their conviction of Nahimana, the Court placed heavy blame on him as a 
speaker rather than on his listeners: 
You were a renowned academic, Professor of History at the National University 
in Rwanda.  You were Director at ORINFOR and founded RTLM radio station 
as an independent and private radio.  You were Political Adviser to the Interim 
Government sworn in after 6 April 1994 under President Sindikubwabo.  You 
were fully aware of the power of words, and you used the radio—the medium of 
communication with the widest public reach—to disseminate hatred and 
violence.6 
Framing agency this way helps explain why the court initially sentenced Nahimana and 
Ngeze to life in prison and Barayagwiza to 35 years. 
 Although the ICTR’s ruling provides some closure for this case, it leaves some 
important unanswered questions for the future: Does “incitement” really exist? If so, 
what exactly constitutes incitement? Is it possible to determine the point at which one 
person’s words end and another’s actions begin? Is it possible to prevent incitement 
without censoring important ideas and worthy criticism? Can the international 
community define and enforce an international standard of incitement? If so, what would 
                                                 
6 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, Summary 29 (2003). 
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make an appropriate punishment for it? Can a consistent international legal precedent for 
this concept deter potential criminals in the future? 
The ICTR has certainly wrestled with many of these questions and has tried to 
provide its own answers. Consequently, how the court frames the agency of various 
actors determines who can and should be prosecuted under international law and how 
they should be punished.  Additionally, it shapes how people all over the world 
understand the communication process and sheds light on the manner in which humanity 
grapples with ethical dilemmas. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to explore the 
options available to the international court when it comes to rendering decisions about 
incitement when questions of agency and culpability are not immediately clear. 
 To explore these options, I examine how different countries define incitement, 
literature about agency and ethics, and the judges’ direct statements to Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, and Ngeze about the power of language. A comparison of international 
speech codes will show the available possibilities for definitions of the concept, and an 
analysis of important cases, rulings, and responses will help evaluate their strengths and 
weaknesses. Additionally, literature about agency, ethics, and violence will provide 
theoretical grounds for legal applications. Finally, drawing lessons from the events that 
took place in Rwanda, I suggest some ideas for the future. 
 The next chapter shifts the focus from local issues to larger questions involving 
international politics. Moving away from the process of how incitement operates on the 
ground, this chapter examines how external bodies (other state and non-state entities) 
respond to accusations of incitement to genocide. Whereas the previous chapter 
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examined the agency and culpability of those directly involved in the incitement process, 
this chapter will examine how the process might be interrupted from the outside. It will 
ask what roles and responsibilities, if any, external states and international bodies should 
have when it comes to genocide prevention. 
 In this chapter, I focus on the rhetoric that influential external policymakers used 
to justify their decisions not to intervene in the genocide.  This chapter will try to 
understand the discussions and actions of the United States, France, China, and the 
United Nations. If many people around the world share the goal of genocide prevention, 
the puzzle of Rwanda is how genocide could be carried out there while so many people 
did nothing. 
 The US has received much of the criticism of the West for its failure to intervene, 
and perhaps rightfully so. Members of the US Department of State and others within the 
Clinton administration knew what was happening in Rwanda and chose not to get 
involved. The common justification they usually provided was the failure of the US to 
prevent violence in the Somali Civil War.7 After some particularly brutal incidents 
involving US troops in Somalia, many senior policymakers hesitated to commit US 
troops to African causes. However, other policymakers suggest that Rwanda would 
probably not have been a priority regardless of what happened in Somalia. Although 
many people would argue that the US does not and should not need to take the 
paternalistic role of world police, critics of this position argue that US military 
                                                 
7 Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwandan Genocide  (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 
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involvement could have prevented or at least curtailed the length and severity of the 
genocide. 
 Moreover, many have argued that the US could have made a significant dent 
without necessarily committing any troops at all. This argument explores the option of a 
radio jam, which would disrupt the radio signals that Nahimana and Barayagwiza used 
to spread hate messages and, more importantly, explicit directions to the Interahamwe 
militias. Not only could a radio jam have provided an alternative to a military incursion, 
but it also could have directly negated the power of messages that arguably constituted 
incitement.  
 Considering the options available to the US and the severity of the events and 
aftermath of the genocide, many critics point fingers at the US government for its 
inaction. To some extent, some of this finger-pointing is justified; at the same time, the 
US cannot fight all of the world’s battles (hard as it may try), and when it does, it should 
not have to do so singlehanded. Moreover, more recent scholarship has begun to point 
fingers elsewhere. For instance, some scholars have examined the links between former 
French President François Mitterrand and his son Jean-Christophe and former Rwandan 
President Juvénal Habyarimana, whose assassination triggered the genocide. 
Additionally, others have begun to question the roles that other countries might have 
played. Finally, some people have also pointed fingers at the UN for its early withdrawal 
from the country. The situation is therefore much more complicated that simply a US 
failure. 
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 In this chapter, I analyze the rhetoric used to justify and critique political 
decisions (not) to intervene. As more information about the Rwandan genocide becomes 
available, it seems clearer that the genocide resulted from many collective 
communicative failures rather than simply the failures of one or two parties. If this 
proves to be true, a close examination of the decision-making processes of external 
parties should help determine how they individually and collectively failed to prevent 
genocide in Rwanda and how the international community might overcome these 
obstacles in the future.  
 Additionally, I explore the rhetoric of retrospective suggestions for preventing 
genocide. Many of those closely involved in the genocide have proposed lessons to be 
learned from Rwanda and suggestions for preventing future genocides. Unfortunately, 
the “never again” mantra of Holocaust remembrance has not lived up to its promise even 
after Rwanda, given the events that took place in Darfur. Nevertheless, genocide 
prevention remains a worthy goal, and arguments toward this cause deserve to be 
scrutinized.  
 Next, the legal chapter examines the ICTR’s handling of the Rwandan genocide 
from. The question here shifts focus again from the rhetoric of local and external actions 
during the genocide to the international response after it ended. After the genocide, the 
UN granted the ICTR authority to try cases of high-level genocidaires and granted 
Rwanda authority to try low-level ones. In this particular case, the UN’s international 
court system has been both praised for simplifying and blamed for complicating the 
judicial process. Consequently, a critical assessment of the ICTR’s strengths and 
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weaknesses might facilitate genocide prevention, or, at the very least, lead to better 
adjudication of cases in which the international community fails to prevent genocide. 
 Of course, the ICTR has made some remarkable achievements, and it deserves to 
be commended for them. First, the ICTR assumed a role that would be simply too large 
and too difficult for Rwanda’s legal system to handle in the direct aftermath of the 
genocide. Second, as I previously mentioned, the ICTR successfully apprehended and 
convicted these three men for incitement to genocide. Given that all three had fled the 
country, that efforts to find and capture them required strong international political 
pressure, negotiation, and cooperation, and that several legal and political obstacles 
almost led to their release throughout the entire process, it is simply astounding that even 
the ICTR succeeded in these efforts. In short, the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath 
demonstrate a need for an international justice system. 
 On the other hand, the ICTR has also been criticized from several angles. For 
starters, the Rwandan government expressed dissatisfaction with the creation of the 
tribunal. This contentious issue begs the question of whether international courts should 
have the right to overrule the will of many of the people whose interests they seek to 
defend. Second, like the gacaca courts (local trials) within Rwanda, the work at the 
ICTR has been painfully slow. The court did not deliver its sentence to Nahimana, 
Ngeze, and Barayagwiza until 2003, nearly a decade after the genocide, and it is still 
trying cases to this day. Third, international jurisdiction opens up a Pandora’s Box of 
free speech questions, including but not limited to competing standards, line drawing, 
self-censorship, and government censorship. Whereas other issues in Rwanda’s case 
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demonstrate a need for international justice, these issues demonstrate a need for local 
justice. It seems that some kind of balance must be struck between the two, but the exact 
line is not yet clear.Accordingly, this chapter attempts to resolve some of the tension 
between local and international jurisdiction and to explore the free speech implications 
of an international incitement standard. To explore answers to some of the unresolved 
issues of the ICTR, I turn to law reviews, literature on transitional justice and 
reconciliation, literature about free speech and international law, and statements made by 
lawyers and officials about the legal process of the ICTR. By tying the moral, political, 
and legal issues together, I hope to learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the 
“Media Trial” in order to further discussions of legal and political rhetoric, free speech, 
transitional justice, and communication ethics.  
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CHAPTER II 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE TRANSFER OF WORDS TO ACTION: 
UNDERSTANDING INCITEMENT AS SITUATIONAL VIOLENCE 
 
 The first question to ask when dealing with an abstract concept like incitement is 
an ontological one; that is, whether such a phenomenon even exists. Indeed, it is at least 
hypothetically plausible to suggest that the concept of incitement is invented, arbitrary, 
and even meaningless. To hold this position, one could insist that individuals maintain 
complete control over their own decisions and that no combination of words can ever 
truly provoke them to action. This rather extreme approach posits that individuals act 
entirely out of their own volition. Perhaps the greatest strength of such a position lies in 
the fact that it grants unlimited agency to those on the receiving end of messages. For 
better or worse, it treats people as free, active, and autonomous beings who are fully 
capable of making their own decisions. However, as any teenager who has ever tried to 
fit into the “popular” crowd knows, social pressures can and do affect humans’ ability to 
make rational decisions. 
 This approach to incitement therefore encounters several problems. First, it 
implies that both the words we use and the status of speakers are unimportant and 
inconsequential. Second, it fails to explain why, under many circumstances, violent or 
even genocidal inclinations that stir among a population often do not materialize. Third, 
it exempts those who use words as a way to bring harm to others from ethical 
responsibility. Thus, to place blame entirely on individual actors ignores the fact that 
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such actors, despite what may be malicious intent, often fail to act until they are 
provoked. 
Furthermore, concrete examples from history also challenge the notion that 
incitement does not exist. The Rwandan genocide is one such example. In the aftermath 
of the genocide, an abundance of evidence has surfaced to link the media, specifically 
Kangura magazine and Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), to a 
systematic extermination campaign that encouraged Hutus to rise up against their Tutsi 
neighbors. In the years leading up to the genocide, Rwanda was caught in a civil war 
between the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government of 
Juvénal Habyarimana. The RPF and the Habyarimana government reached a cease-fire 
with the Arusha Accords in August 1993. On April 6, 1994, however, everything 
changed when the plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President 
Cyprien Ntaryamira went down. Over the next three months, the Hutu interahamwe 
militias killed roughly 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Moreover, as lawyer 
Christina Carroll points out, “thousands of people were raped and tortured[,] and over 
three million refugees were forced to flee from the country.”8 Based on this historical 
example, I argue that incitement exists, that it should be taken seriously in discussions of 
morality and criminal law, and that an understanding of incitement within a broader 
picture of violence requires a degree of moral and legal accountability for both inciters 
and individual actors in clearly identifiable cases.  
                                                 
8 Christina M. Carroll, "An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994," 
Boston University International Law Journal 18(2000): 170. 
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A striking feature of the Rwandan genocide is the amount of evidence that has 
linked the media to the killings. The material leading up to, and certainly during, the 
genocide suggests that Kangura and RTLM created a pervasive climate of fear and 
divisionism that set neighbor against neighbor. The sustained, explicit, and vitriolic 
media campaign sent a clear message that years of ethnic conflict could only be solved 
through systematic extermination of the Tutsis. As Canadian General Roméo Dalliare, 
the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), later 
recalled, the “hate media were essentially the soundtrack of the genocide and were 
deployed as a weapon.”9 Not only did the media tell people whom to hate, but also 
whom, specifically, to kill. In some cases, they even went farther than that. Specific 
recordings and transcripts from Rwanda make a strong case for incitement. 
  Before the genocide, both Kangura and RTLM were full of anti-Tutsi 
propaganda. Both frequently used the ethnic slurs inyenzi (cockroaches) and inkotanyi 
(warriors) to describe Tutsis. Ngeze stopped publishing Kangura a month before the 
genocide, but its publications before April 6 were quite explicit. For example, an article 
called “The Ten Commandments of the Bahutu” opened by calling Tutsis “bloodthirsty 
and power-hungry” and asserted that “Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi[s].”10 
The same article then listed a long line of offenses that made any Hutu a traitor, 
including anyone “who espouses a Tutsi woman, who takes a Tutsi woman as a 
concubine, who takes a Tutsi as his secretary or his protégée . . . who makes an alliance 
                                                 
9 Allan Thompson, ed. The Media and the Rwandan Genocide (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007), 3. 
10 Hassan Ngeze, "Appeal to the Bahutu Concscience (With the Hutu Ten Commandments),"  Kangura, 
no. 6 (1990), http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k06a.html. 
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with Tutsis in business, who invests his money or the State’s money in the company of a 
Tutsi, who lends or borrows money from a Tutsi, [or] who gives favors to Tutsis in 
business.”11 Another issue opened with a picture of a machete (the weapon of choice for 
many of the perpetrators of the genocide once it was underway) and the title “What 
weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?”12 In Kangura No. 40, 
Ngeze even published “an official list of 123 names of suspects . . . with an express 
warning that the government was not adequately protecting [Hutus] from these people 
and that they needed to organize their own self-defence to prevent their own 
extermination.”13 Messages like these appeared frequently in the magazine. 
Although it was not published during the genocide, Kangura produced many 
volumes full of propaganda that set the stage for the hateful messages that RTLM would 
later broadcast to the nation. Moreover, the magazine’s publisher, Hassan Ngeze, 
“worked very closely together [with RTLM’s Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza] in the CDR,”14 
even though Ngeze did not play a direct role in the station’s creation.15 Because of its 
timing, Kangura played an indirect role in the genocide, but it maintained a consistent 
and extreme position of Hutu Power.  
 RTLM started off more moderately, but even its early broadcasts were far from 
innocent. As ICTR expert witness Alison Des Forges recalled: 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 "Cover Illustration,"  Kangura, no. 26 (1991), http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k26.html. 
13  "List of People Who Have Joined the Inkotanyi,"  Kangura, no. 40 (1993), 
http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k40v.html. 
14 The Coalition pour la Défense de la République, an extremist Hutu political party. 
15 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, Summary 14. 
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 From late October [1993] on, RTLM repeatedly and forcefully underlined many 
of the themes developed for years by the extremist written press, including the 
inherent differences between Hutu[s] and Tutsi[s], the foreign origin of Tutsi[s] 
and, hence, their lack of rights to claim to be Rwandan, the disproportionate 
share of wealth and power held by Tutsi[s] and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. It 
continually stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and 
demanded that the Hutu[s] prepare to ‘defend’ themselves against the Tutsi 
threat.16 
As RTLM repeated these messages, many people throughout the nation began to accept 
this logic, even if they did so reluctantly. As one witness testified, “I did not believe 
Tutsi[s] were coming to kill us . . . but when the government radio continued to 
broadcast that they were coming to take our land, were coming to kill the Hutu[s]—
when this was repeated over and over—I began to feel some kind of fear.”17  
RTLM had not yet explicitly called for murder, but it had stirred fear and distrust among 
the population.  
 That message changed its tone at the very beginning of the genocide. Just a few 
hours after Habyarimana’s plane went down, the explicit message to kill became clear. 
On April 6, one broadcast declared that “the graves [were] not yet full” and asked, “Who 
is going to do the work and help us fill them completely?”18 In the months to follow, 
RTLM frequently broadcast overt calls for Hutus to exterminate Tutsis. One broadcast 
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“called on Hutu[s] ‘to rise up as a single man’ to defend their country in what was said 
to be the ‘final’ war.”19 Another told the people to “rise up, stand fast, and fight the 
Inkotanyi using stones, machetes and spears, while rejoicing that in the end the Inkotanyi 
would be exterminated.”20 Another declared that “the [Hutu] revolution of 1959 [was] 
not over and must be carried through to its conclusion.” Just a few hours after 
Habyarimana’s death, RTLM had already begun a clear call for vengeance. 
 Against the backdrop of years of civil war and an assassinated president, it would 
not be surprising for the media to discuss who might be responsible for such an attack, 
nor would it be surprising to implicate the RPF as a suspect.21 However, RTLM did 
much more than that. For starters, the station’s calls for extermination targeted Tutsis as 
a whole, not just members of the RPF. One announcer made it clear that “the reason we 
will exterminate them is that they belong to [another] ethnic group.”22 The same 
announcer then told listeners to “look at the person’s height and his physical appearance. 
Just look at his small nose and then break it.”23 Another announcer declared that “the 
cruelty of the inyenzi can only be cured by their total extermination.”24 Furthermore, 
when the RTLM used euphemisms like “go work” and “go clean,” Hutus understood 
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these euphemisms to mean to kill Tutsis.25 The station repeatedly encouraged the Hutu 
interahamwe militia to commit acts of violence and murder. 
 Moreover, both Kangura and RTLM identified specific targets. RTLM often 
“identified certain individuals who were described as accomplices and told the 
militiamen to find and execute them.”26 But the announcers did not stop there. They 
even told people where to attack. On many occasions, RTLM listed off Tutsis’ hiding 
places and directed the militias to attack them and kill everyone inside.27 Perhaps more 
than anything else, broadcasts that targeted specific individuals show a direct link 
between the media and the killings. 
 Finally, the radio even praised those committing the genocide on the air. One 
announcer, for example, expressed satisfaction at the large number of Inyenzi killed in 
the country.”28 In one case, “an announcer urged people guarding a barrier in Kigali city 
to eliminate Tutsi[s] in a vehicle just nearing the checkpoint” and then “congratulated 
the killers, praising their vigilance and telling them to continue their work with greater 
vigour.”29 RTLM’s commendation of killers thus encouraged more attacks. 
Although incitement can sometimes be an elusive concept, the evidence against 
the media in Rwanda makes a pretty clear case. The newspaper and radio encouraged 
both the extermination of a whole ethnic group and the execution of particular 
individuals. Not only did they tell their audiences whom to kill, but they also gave 
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advice about where to go and how to do it. Evidence suggests that RTLM’s endorsement 
of killers on air further contributed to violence on the ground. For those who deny the 
existence of incitement, the events in Rwanda present a significant challenge. 
The ability to recognize even what seems like a clear case of incitement to 
genocide, however, is more of a starting point than an endpoint when it comes to 
questions of ethics, as genocide on its own is a complicated matter. Political Philosopher 
Larry May argues that, “in many ways, genocide in international law presents some of 
the most significant philosophical challenges of all of the areas of international criminal 
law.”30 As he later explains, genocide “raises significant questions of how to think about 
individual culpability because the crime of genocide is both in act and in intent a 
collective crime.”31 When many people act together as part of a large effort, it is difficult 
to sort out who did what. 
The tension between individual and collective acts certainly comes to light in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Just the sheer efficiency of the killing and the 
number of accused genocidaires in Rwanda presents a great challenge to those who wish 
to assign responsibility. As Michael Barnett explains: 
In one hundred days, between April 6 and July 19, 1994, [Rwandan Hutus] 
murdered roughly eight hundred thousand individuals. For the statistically 
inclined, that works out to 333½ deaths per hour, 5½ deaths per minute. The rate 
of murder was even greater during the first four weeks, when most of the deaths 
occurred. The Rwandan genocide, therefore, has the macabre distinction of 
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exceeding the rate of killing attained during the Holocaust. And unlike the Nazis, 
who used modern industrial technology to accomplish the most primitive of ends, 
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide employed primarily low-tech and 
physically demanding instruments of death that required an intimacy with their 
victims.32 
To accomplish this efficiency required roughly a one-to-one ratio of killers to victims, a 
massive scale on both ends.33 Even though the “everyone is doing it” excuse does not 
justify individual actions, when such a large number of people act in concert with one 
another, the threat of punishment at least appears to diminish significantly. Simply put, it 
is very difficult to assign moral and legal culpability under these circumstances. 
 If genocide alone is complex, then adding the abstract concept of incitement to it 
makes it even more complex, as incitement implies an ambiguous relationship among 
individuals and a vicarious execution of motives. If one person’s words can be said to 
incite another person or group to action, then who is responsible for the final outcome? 
Where do the speaker’s words end and the listener’s actions begin? There are several 
possible answers to these questions.  
One such answer has already been discussed; that is, to place blame entirely on 
individual actors. Yet, as both abstract theory and the concrete example of the Rwandan 
genocide shows, this answer falls short on a number of levels. Another answer lies in the 
other extreme; that is, to place blame entirely on the inciters. Like its counterpart, such 
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an approach is at least hypothetically plausible. Once we grant that incitement could 
exist, it might be tempting to view it—or any communicative message, for that matter—
as a pure, linear, cause-and-effect transmission of a message. Indeed, many colloquial 
expressions of communication (i.e. “he got the message,” “her point was clear,” 
“communication between them broke down”) reflect an understanding of 
communication as such.  
But this approach (often termed the “hypodermic needle,” “magic bullet,” or 
“conduit” metaphors in communication literature)34 is also extreme in that it fails to 
capture many of the interactional aspects of the process of communication. First, such an 
approach presumes that incitement will automatically produce its intended effects, when 
the reality is that it often fails. Second, it implies a passive audience with no escape route 
from unwanted messages, no critical thinking skills or resistance efforts, and most 
importantly, no responsibility for its actions. To place blame squarely on the inciters is 
to treat those who actually commit the crime as helpless victims who were “just 
following orders”—the classic Nuremberg defense. The “hypodermic needle” model of 
incitement falls short because it presumes a simple cause-and-effect relationship when 
the reality is that communication is often more complex. More importantly, however, it 
pardons everyone who actually engages in immoral and criminal acts.      
 If neither of these extremes fully captures the nature of incitement, then a middle 
ground must be reached. Neither those who encourage extermination nor those who try 
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to cause it should be free from moral responsibilities. An approach that balances these 
two extremes will make room to hold both inciters and individual actors accountable for 
their actions. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the middle ground between these two 
extremes is murky. 
If the prevention of genocidal violence is the ultimate goal of moral and legal 
accountability, then a reconceptualization of different types and causes of violence can 
help assign culpability to multiple parties.  Here, some recent work in micro-sociology 
shows some promise. Sociologist Randall Collins suggests that many common 
assumptions about violence are inaccurate. In particular, Collins struggles with the idea 
that some individuals are naturally more likely to engage in violence than others. In his 
effort to identify the causes of violence, Collins argues that sociologists, psychologists, 
and others interested in violence have overemphasized background conditions and 
personality traits that lead to violence. He argues that “it is a false lead to look for types 
of violent individuals, constant across situations. A huge amount of research has not 
yielded very strong results here.”35 Rather than looking for stable, identifiable traits that 
produce violent tendencies, Collins instead shifts his attention to violent situations. In his 
broad micro-sociological study of violence across a wide variety of contexts—soldiers in 
combat, domestic abuse, bullying, fictional entertainment violence, sports riots, 
terrorism, etc.—Collins argues that situational characteristics, as opposed to personality 
traits and background conditions, predetermine more accurately whether violence will 
occur.  
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 Collins concedes that “conditions, such as being subject to poverty, racial 
discrimination, family disorganization, abuse, and stress” might contribute to a person’s 
motive to commit violence, but he argues that these conditions “are not sufficient . . . 
[and] are far from determining whether violence will happen or not.”36 Indeed, it is easy 
to identify many people who live under one or more of these conditions who do not 
engage in violence and also to identify many who come from backgrounds free of these 
conditions who do. Some important limitations to such theories, then, include the 
objections that they are overly deterministic and do not account for all types of behavior. 
 Collins’s critique of these theories extends these objections in order to challenge 
another common assumption that the theories perpetuate. “My objection across the 
board,” he writes, “is that such explanations assume violence is easy once the motivation 
exists. Micro-situational evidence, to the contrary, shows that violence is hard.”37 To 
support this claim that violence is difficult to carry out, Collins cites military and police 
studies, conducts photographic analysis of people engaged in violence, and examines 
narrative testimony from a variety of sources all over the world. His significant body of 
evidence points to the same conclusion: that violence is difficult to execute unless the 
situation unfolds in a way that makes violent actors confident in their ability to succeed. 
 Based on this evidence, Collins argues for the existence of “confrontational 
tension and fear” that inhibits humans from engaging in most violent acts: 
[V]iolence is a set of pathways around confrontational tension and fear. Despite 
their bluster, and even in situations of apparently uncontrollable anger, people are 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 20. 
37 Ibid. 
 25 
tense and often fearful in the immediate threat of violence—including their own 
violence; this is the emotional dynamic that determines what they will do if 
fighting actually breaks out. Whether indeed that will happen depends on a series 
of conditions or turning-points that shape the tension and fear in particular 
directions, reorganizing the emotions as an interactional process involving 
everyone present: the antagonists, audience, and even ostensibly disengaged 
bystanders.38 
As Collins argues, this confrontational tension and fear is very difficult to overcome. It 
is precisely for this reason, he suggests, that previous theories have fallen short. “No 
matter how motivated someone may be,” Collins argues, “if the situation does not unfold 
so that confrontational tension/fear is overcome, violence will not proceed.”39 In other 
words, situational context matters more than stable socio-psychological traits.  
Such an understanding of the nature of violence helps explain why economically 
disadvantaged Hutus engaged in genocide precisely when they did. The colonial history 
of Rwanda makes it easy to construct a narrative of the violence based on systemic 
inequality. When the Belgians ruled Rwanda, they privileged Tutsis over their Hutu 
counterparts. As Paul Rusesabagina recounts, “Tutsi[s] were told over and over that they 
were aristocratic and physically attractive, while the Hutu[s] were told that they were 
ugly and stupid and worthy only of working in the field.”40 Although Hutus comprised a 
majority of the population, Tutsis comprised Rwanda’s elite. No doubt systemic 
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inequality gave Hutus a reason for violence. To be sure, economic disparity provided a 
motive for Hutus to rise up against Tutsis, and widespread violence did erupt at several 
points after Rwanda gained independence.  
Yet, Hutus did not have a monopoly on this violence before 1994; Tutsis also 
engaged in massacres of Hutus. Thus, even though Hutus constituted a majority of 
Rwanda’s population, widespread Hutu violence always carried with it a threat of Tutsi 
retaliation. Before 1994, Rwanda had extremist speech and incidents of violence, but the 
majority of Hutus did not participate in either. Moral reservations undoubtedly 
contributed to many Hutus’ abstention from the ethnic conflict before and even during 
the genocide. But a substantial number of individuals suddenly engaged in violence after 
April 6. For these individuals, something else must explain why so many Hutus 
abstained from violence until April 6. If Collins’s theory holds, then these Hutus could 
have possessed the motive to engage in genocide, but “confrontational tension and fear” 
previously inhibited them from action. In order to engage in genocide (or any violence), 
a group must have a way to overcome confrontational tension and fear.    
How does that happen? Collins lists several possible mechanisms. One partial 
explanation is simply that distance from the enemy increases a person’s confidence that 
he or she can attack without much risk of being attacked. As those who engage in violent 
confrontations approach one another, confrontational tension and fear increases. For 
example, military studies indicate that shooters at close range often do not fire,41 and 
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even soldiers who aim well in training often miss in battle.42 Distance also helps explain 
why snipers are generally more effective than other shooters43 and why gang members 
engage in drive-by shootings.44 Yet, in Rwanda, where the militias executed much of the 
violence with machetes (about as close-range as fighting individuals can get), the 
distance explanation fails. 
 Another partial explanation that Collins offers is that “social organization is a 
huge component in determining the amount of violence that takes place.”45 By “social 
organization,” Collins means physical “organizational techniques for keeping [people] 
fighting, or at least not running away, even though they are afraid.”46 In other words, the 
physical arrangement of people engaged in a fight, whether in an army formation or in a 
fistfight enclosed among group of spectators, often produces more fighting because 
people cannot physically escape the situation. In other words, if fighters go into fight-or-
flight mode, social organization takes away the flight option. Furthermore, even if a 
fighter successfully maneuvers out of the crowd, he or she will be shunned as a coward.  
The militias in Rwanda certainly fit the social organization part of Collins’s 
theory. Simply by definition, the militias acted as groups that kept each other fighting. 
But social organization alone does not explain why Rwanda erupted in violence 
precisely when it did. Rwanda’s Tutsis had long been a minority, comprising roughly 11 
percent of the total population at the time of the genocide.47 As a sheer numbers game, 
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Hutus could have formed militias at any point and had an organizational advantage. 
However, there is a bigger problem here, in that social organization really only matters 
in the moment. It does not explain how violence erupted in the first place. In short, it 
may account for some of the sustenance of the violence, but it is only a small part of the 
bigger picture.  
Something else must be able to explain how a community shifts from genocidal 
intent to genocidal action. It is certainly logical to argue that a traumatic event (such as 
the assassination of a president) might be enough on its own to move people to action. 
Certainly Rwanda experienced a heightened emotional state after its president was 
killed. Yet, under many circumstances, assassinations of prominent leaders do not result 
in mass killings.  Traumatic events can easily factor into climates that lead to violence, 
but they, too, are incomplete explanations.  
A rhetorical explanation might explain more clearly how genocidal intent shifts 
to genocidal action. As Kenneth Burke argues, rhetoric has the power to reshape social 
order:   
In pure identification there would be no strife. Likewise, there would be no strife 
in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a 
mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing the 
first condition necessary for their interchange of blows. But put identification and 
division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where 
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one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to 
rhetoric.48 
Before Habyarimana’s death, Rwanda had been divided, but Hutu extremists failed to 
influence the majority of other Hutus to join their cause. When the president’s plane 
went down, it shifted the rhetorical situation. A crisis such as this created an opportunity 
to reinforce and capitalize on the hateful themes that Kangura and RTLM had developed 
for years. Just a few hours after the plane crash, RTLM made unambiguous calls for 
absolute Hutu unity, and the killing began. The words over the radio also may not fully 
explain the shift from Hutu division to Hutu unity, but, at the very least, they reinforced 
it. For this reason, incitement is not inconsequential.  
 As a rhetorical explanation for violence, however, incitement explains more than 
just how a genocide starts; once genocide is underway, incitement plays yet another 
important role in fueling the fire. Collins argues that even in the situations in which 
violence does erupt, it is difficult to sustain. “When [individuals or groups] do actually 
come to violence,” he argues, “the determining conditions are overwhelmingly in their 
short-term interaction.”49 Not only is violence difficult to produce, but once it happens, 
“it takes continuous social pressure to keep a fight going.”50 In his view, it is exhausting 
to overcome confrontational tension and fear perpetually. Thinking of violence as 
situational rather than psychological helps explain the both the efficiency and duration of 
violence. 
                                                 
48 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives  (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962). 25. 
49 Collins, Violence: 337. 
50 Ibid., 14. 
 30 
 In Rwanda, some of the most incriminating pieces of evidence against the media 
include transcripts of calls to exterminate specific individuals and exposure of group 
hiding places. When Kangura or RTLM circulated the names and/or locations of various 
individuals, it gave the militias a clear advantage and handed the targeted individuals a 
virtual death sentence. Furthermore, when the radio spread anti-Tutsi propaganda or 
celebrated the militias’ actions, it added to the atmosphere of Hutu solidarity. 
Inflammatory messages and explicit directions certainly help explain the efficiency and 
duration of the violence. 
 If Collins’s situational approach more accurately describes how violence occurs 
than previous sociological and psychological theories, then it can also be a useful tool to 
explain how genocide operates. A key challenge to the study of genocide is to explain 
how so many people can engage in sustained, organized, efficient, and brutal killing of 
their neighbors. Here I have argued that incitement can be an important tool that 
contributes to this process. It is certainly not the only tool that causes or fuels genocide, 
but its role as a catalyst is powerful enough that it must not be ignored. As a way to 
overcome Collins’s confrontational tension and fear, incitement helps to explain how a 
group can enter into and sustain a campaign of systematic extermination.  
More importantly, viewing incitement as part of a larger system of contextual 
violence makes room to hold both the inciters and individual actors accountable for their 
actions. Yet, once again, this brings up the question of culpability. To hold both inciters 
and individual actors accountable opens up another important question: to what extent 
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should each be held accountable? Once again, the navigation between extremes is not 
easy. In his discussion of the issue, May outlines this tension well: 
The question of what role individual intent should play in crimes that are by and 
large collective ones is a very difficult one. On one level it seems unfair to try to 
make an individual responsible for a crime perpetrated by a group upon another 
group. Indeed, the most appropriate thing to do is to hold the group responsible. 
But criminal law is not well set up for such proceedings. Criminal law is 
designed to deal with individual people in the dock. Normally, of course, this is 
not problematic if the individual is charged with a crime that he or she has fully 
committed on his or her own. But when an individual is charged with a collective 
crime such as genocide and that individual only did a part of the crime, 
something seems to have gone wrong. This is why the individual who is most 
deserving of conviction and punishment, if anyone is, will be the one who 
planned the crime, and only secondarily the one who merely participated in it.51 
Indeed, May’s approach, written long after the genocide, is consistent with the actual 
approach taken by the ICTR. The ICTR took on the leaders of the genocide, and it 
included senior media executives among those who helped orchestrate the genocide. 
 Meanwhile, the court relegated many of the individual actors to the local courts. 
Although May makes a good point that “the most appropriate thing to do is to hold the 
group responsible,” the group is far too large to try in an international court.52 To give 
hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fair trials in an international court would cost too 
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much money and take too long. At the same time, letting these individuals go scot-free 
absolves them from any kind of wrongdoing. As these moral and legal questions do not 
take place in a vacuum, it seems reasonable to use local legal systems to hold these 
individuals accountable.   
Pragmatic issues aside, however, there is yet another reason to try inciters at a 
higher level than individual actors. As May points out, “The crime of genocide involves 
both individual intent elements and a collective intent element, the latter involving an 
intent to destroy a group.”53 Both inciters and individual actors can demonstrate 
individual intent, but, as May explains: 
The person who plans and initiates, or who incites, a genocide more clearly 
instantiates the collective intent than does the person who merely participates. 
The reason for this is that planning can organize the acts of others into a joint 
endeavor. Similarly . . . incitement can excite and ‘organize’ individuals to act 
together to reach a common objective. . . . For this reason the planners and 
inciters should be more clearly responsible for the collective crime than are those 
who participate, although those who participate can also instantiate the collective 
intent as well.54 
Such reasoning is consistent with Collins’s situational view of violence. If violence is 
difficult to produce, then it requires a way around confrontational tension and fear. 
Incitement can account for both the initiation and continuation of violence. Although 
genocide would not occur without individual actors (and those actors should be held 
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morally and legally responsible for their actions), it also would not occur without 
organizers to unite said actors under a common cause. As planners and promoters of 
genocide, inciters should receive a larger portion of the blame for their actions. 
 The case of the Rwandan genocide demonstrates that incitement can play a 
serious role in violent crimes. However, as previously shown, the prosecution presented 
a strong case against Rwandan media executives. Although this case is pretty clear, other 
cases may not be. Despite the clarity of this case, incitement remains an elusive concept, 
and taking all allegations of the crime at face value might censor valuable speech. 
Therefore, a contextual approach to this category of speech might be more appropriate 
than a hard standard. 
It is important to note that there is little international consensus about what 
constitutes incitement. Since laws about hate speech and incitement vary among nations, it 
might be difficult to determine whose law(s) to use. As Dina Temple-Raston points out, “the 
Supreme Court of the United States hasn’t upheld a conviction for hate speech since 1951. . . 
. [By contrast,] Denmark outlaws racial slurs. Britain and Switzerland have similar 
prohibitions. And Germany has gone so far as to convict right-wing leaders of inciting racial 
hatred.”55 Therefore, if the UN plans to follow one overarching law, its current standard of 
“direct and public incitement to genocide” fails to account for significant, nuanced 
differences among various conflicting incitement laws.   
Consequently, a major concern with this trial is its potential to draw the line for 
questions of incitement in cases large enough to merit international attention, particularly 
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since it was the first trial of this kind in more than fifty years and the second one in history. 
On the one hand, the case against Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze was so clear that its 
use as a legal precedent might require an equally high burden of proof in subsequent cases. 
Holding other cases to this high of a standard, however, might dismiss other speech that 
clearly qualifies as incitement. On the other hand, a lower burden of proof might be too 
broad and therefore might punish speech that should be protected. 
 A similar concern to line drawing is the threat of producing a so-called “chilling 
effect” on speech. A chilling effect implies that the enforcement of laws that limit “bad” 
speech may also unintentionally limit “good” speech. In this case, the limitations regarding 
incitement could easily have a chilling effect either by the self-censorship of journalists or 
by governments that label critical speech as “incitement” in order to stifle opposition. 
Indeed, some have suggested that such a chilling effect has already occurred in Rwanda. 
“Rwandan law guarantees freedom of the press but it is not always protected,” Carroll 
argues. “Journalists have difficulty getting licenses and they are harassed and sometimes 
even imprisoned if they express views counter to government opinion. Thus, self-censorship 
is common.”56 Moreover, as lawyer Diane Orentlicher argues, governments are quick to 
stifle opposition: 
 [T]he misuse of hate-speech laws by repressive African governments may well be a 
greater threat right now than hate speech itself. Since 2002, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists has documented nearly fifty such cases in at least half a dozen countries 
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including Rwanda, where the current government] has increasingly used allegations 
of ethnic ‘divisionism’ to silence critics, including those in the press.57 
Orentlicher’s concern that “the misuse of hate speech laws . . . may well be a greater threat 
right now than hate speech itself” might be a bit of a stretch, it is, nevertheless, self-
censorship and abuse of the law are valid concerns shared by many African journalists. In 
any case, despite the judges’ rulings about incitement, the concept remains somewhat 
elusive, particularly for cases in which the evidence is not so clear. Definitions of 
incitement, issues of line-drawing, and misuse of the judges’ conclusions may continue to 
haunt both Rwandan and international law in the future.  
However, a few contextual details taken from the Rwandan genocide and the “media 
trial” might serve well for a definition of incitement. However, given both the variety of 
international laws and the variety of situations that might come up, context may have to 
dictate whether they apply to other situations. This is not to say that this definition is 
completely exhaustive, that all parts of it must be fulfilled, or that it is arbitrary; in fact, the 
creation of a clear, comprehensive standard might tell those who plan genocide exactly how 
much they can get away with under international law. However, with limited precedent on 
what constitutes incitement, theorizing the factors that constituted incitement at Nuremberg 
and the ICTR definition might be useful for lawyers, journalists, and scholars.  
Some of these factors include: (1) that the message is targeted toward specific 
individuals or groups, (2) that the message encourages people to act at a specific time (3) 
that the message is repeated to a level that it has created a pervasive culture of fear and 
divisionism, and (4) that the message occurs in an environment in which its listeners are not 
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subject to opposing viewpoints. Again, this list is not meant to be a checklist of factors that 
must be present in order to label something as incitement, but rather as tools that lawyers can 
use for clarification of an abstract concept. 
 The first two parts of this definition, targeting specific people, helps to avoid vague 
empty threats. Extremists like the Ku Klux Klan often make vague threats against whole 
groups of people, but the vagueness of the threats is unlikely to transfer into action. 
Moreover, as Lee Bollinger argues, there may be social and pedagogical advantages to 
protecting the speech of extremists.58 However, one aspect of both Kangura and RTLM that 
made them particularly effective was that they targeted specific people. Not only did their 
hate propaganda expand from the RPF to all Tutsis, but they even went so far as to list 
names of specific individuals to find and kill. RTLM even announced where people on its 
lists were hiding so that the militias could hunt them down. Targeting specific individuals at 
a specific time makes the threat much more immediate and likely that words will transfer to 
actions. 
 Furthermore, the notions of repetition or climate may be useful to distinguish a one-
time rally from a consistent message. As May points out, “Collective crimes do not 
generally arise overnight. Patterns of behavior develop including strong animus between 
various social groups. Public expressions of condemnation for such crimes would arguably 
stand a chance of lessening such animus.”59 This part of a definition of incitement may be 
useful in cases like Ngeze’s, in which a time lapse occurred between words and action.60 
Indeed, drawing on precedent from Julius Streicher’s case at Nuremberg, the ICTR recalled 
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that Streicher “was found to have ‘injected into the minds of thousands of Germans’ a 
‘poison’ that caused them to support the National Socialist policy of a Jewish persecution 
and extermination.”61 Thus, even though Ngeze did not publish Kangura during the 
genocide, the court found that it “paved the way for the genocide in Rwanda, whipping the 
Hutu population into a killing frenzy.”62 Evidence that a publication’s repetition of hate 
propaganda contributed to a culture of fear and division may be useful for claims of 
incitement, especially if there is a time lapse between words and action. 
Finally, another useful part of incitement might be that listeners are not exposed to 
competing messages. In Rwanda, where RTLM was the only perspective heard on the radio, 
people only heard one side of the story, and they heard it consistently for months at a time. 
Furthermore, in Rwanda, which had virtually twice as many radios per person than the 
median of sub-Saharan African countries,63 radio occupied a special niche. When RTLM 
went over the airwaves, it held a monopoly. As Chalk notes: 
Once the genocide was underway, there were no broadcasts by UNAMIR, VOA, 
BBC, or Radio Deutschwelle to warn the extremist Hutu forces that those who 
committed or abetted mass murder stood condemned in the eyes of the world and 
would be brought to justice.  There were no broadcasts by third parties to the 
conflict urging Hutu villagers to defend their Tutsi friends and neighbors, to offer 
them refuge, or to combat the myth that the RPF were executing a genocide 
against Hutu Rwandese.64 
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Without opposing viewpoints, the hateful messages coming from the radio may have seemed 
more persuasive, particularly in a moment of heightened tension after the assassination of a 
president. Absence of opposing views, therefore, may be an important part of establishing 
incitement. 
 Meanwhile, these lessons about incitement in Rwanda do not constitute an 
exhaustive list, nor should future cases be held to exactly the same standards. It seems best 
to continue to work with precedent but also to allow for context to dictate what does and 
does not constitute incitement. When a court does determine that incitement has occurred, 
however, a standard that holds both speakers and listeners accountable seems like the most 
reasonable approach.  
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CHAPTER III 
“ACTUALLY ‘DO SOMETHING’”: 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RESPONSE 
 
 In addition to what happened within Rwanda’s borders, there is a larger 
discussion concerning the role of the international community. Academics, journalists, 
politicians, and writers inside and outside of Rwanda have pointed their fingers at the 
UN and a number of countries for their actions (or lack thereof) in relation to the 
genocide. After all, if the prevention of genocide is an international goal, then it cannot 
be merely a local issue. To the extent that the international community can learn from 
the past, such finger-pointing may be justified. Thus, it is not my primary intention here 
to continue pointing fingers, but rather to synthesize the lessons learned from how other 
countries contributed to the genocide. 
Nevertheless, the finger-pointing discussions make a good starting place for 
analysis. A good portion of the finger-pointing has been directed at the United States. 
This criticism often targets US government officials and media for the nation’s failure to 
act in Rwanda until far too late. For starters, if the US media had served their asserted 
watchdog role, then it might have been able to mobilize citizens to pressure the 
government; however, the story made very few headlines. More importantly, however, 
given the financial, military, and diplomatic power of the United States, it certainly 
could have done more to help.  
 40 
Nevertheless, officials at the US State Department and the Pentagon decided not 
to intervene. The standard response offered by US officials for nonintervention in 
Rwanda is concern about exposing US foreign aid workers to serious danger after 
several peacekeepers were brutally and publicly murdered in Somalia in 1993. On 
October 3 of that year, members of the Somali National Alliance killed eighteen 
Americans, dragging one to death in the streets of Mogadishu. The images circulated 
through the media, and, as Cohen explains, “the disaster brought immediate criticism of 
the Clinton administration and this ‘negative residue from Somalia’ became the 
Congressional basis for opposition to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy.”65 
Many US government officials claim that this incident in Somalia made them think 
twice about committing US forces to other international operations.  
These officials often justify their nonintervention in Rwanda based on the events 
that took place in Somalia. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell explains: 
“we had to put our blinders on and I do not apologize for that because we had to address 
our primary responsibility—American citizens . . . If Rwandans were being killed I’m 
sorry, but I had an obligation to get Americans out.’”66 With bloody and gruesome 
images from Somalia on people’s minds, Bushnell’s concern may have seemed rational 
at the time. After all, nobody wants to knock on a mother and father’s door to tell them 
that their child has been killed.  
However, Bushnell’s recollection is much more pleasant than stories coming 
from other US government officials, who suggest that Rwanda would have remained off 
                                                 
65 Cohen, One Hundred Days: 50. 
66 Ibid., 75. 
 41 
the radar regardless of what took place in Somalia. For example, one official recalls that 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner told him that “if something happens 
in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list. U.S. national interest is not 
involved and we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists, like important 
problems like the Middle East and North Korea and so on. Just make it go away.’”67 
Although this comment came before the genocide was underway, similar stories from 
other officials suggest that Wisner was not alone in his sentiments even long after April 
6, 1994. Many leaders in the US simply did not want to get involved.  
To be sure, the US cannot police the rest of the world and certainly cannot solve 
all of its problems alone. As Madeleine Albright and William Cohen have argued, the 
“responsibility for genocide prevention and response does not fall to the United States 
alone”68 and that the US “may not always have enough influence by itself to prevent 
genocide and mass atrocities.”69 Although they do not pardon the United States for its 
inaction, they add that: 
[O]ther governments have been willing to turn a blind eye to mass atrocities. 
Sometimes this indifference is a direct result of their own complicity, or a 
judgment that their own national interests override any concerns about mounting 
atrocities. Sometimes, governments seek refuge in the principle of a state’s 
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sovereign right of noninterference in its internal affairs at the expense of victims 
of mass atrocities.70 
Although they concede that the US is not innocent, they argue that other countries are 
not either. To those looking for blame and trying to determine what went wrong, such a 
claim may sound like a red herring; however, the US cannot do everything, and certainly 
not alone.  
Nevertheless, to absolve the US of the task to singlehandedly prevent genocide in 
Rwanda or elsewhere is not to excuse it from doing too little or nothing at all. Indeed, as 
a member of the UN Security Council and as a global superpower, the US could have 
used its power in a number of ways.  As Samantha Power argues, “it is not hard to 
conceive of how the United States might have done things differently.”71 She argues that 
the US “could have agreed to Belgian pleas for UN reinforcements . . .  or, if it had 
feared associating with shoddy UN peacekeeping, it could have intervened unilaterally 
with the Security Council’s backing, as France did in June . . . [or] acted without the 
UN’s blessing, as it would do five years later in Kosovo.72 Furthermore, as I will explain 
later, the US could have jammed the radio in Rwanda if it did not want to commit troops 
for a ground attack. In short, critics have attacked the US for its failure to act until it was 
far too late. 
 At the same time, Albright and Cohen have a point that if we must place blame 
somewhere, then other countries also must share part of the blame. Certainly the US is 
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not the only country that could have done more to halt the Rwandan genocide. Many 
critics like have also pointed their fingers at France. Whereas the US has been charged 
mostly for its inaction, France has been charged with complicity. Indeed, the great 
degree of cooperation between the governments of François Mitterand and Juvenal 
Habyarimana has led many people to question France’s actions leading up to and during 
the genocide. In fact, the relationship between the two leaders was so strong that “in 
Kigali the French president was laughingly called ‘Mitterahamwe,’”73 a clear reference 
to the interahamwe militia that executed much of the genocide. Daniela Kroslak argues 
that the French government “was heavily involved on the ground and maintained good 
relations with the elites that eventually committed the genocide.”74 Given the close 
cooperation between the governments in Paris and Kigali and France’s limited action on 
the UN Security Council throughout most of the genocide, critics of the Mitterand 
government have questioned France’s actions within Rwanda leading up to the genocide 
and its inaction on the UN Security Council. 
 For starters, in the years leading up to the genocide, France contributed heavily to 
Rwanda’s military. Records show that “during 1991-1992, at least US$6 million of arms 
from France was sent into Rwanda: mortars, light artillery, armoured cars and 
helicopters. By 1993, Rwanda was receiving US$4 million military aid from France.”75 
Additionally, Kroslak adds that “Paris also financed the supply of arms coming from 
third parties such as Egypt . . . [and] French agents acted as intermediaries to facilitate 
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the signing of a supply contract with South Africa for US $5.9 million.”76 The 
combination of diplomatic and military support for Habyarimana’s government and later 
his inner circle puts France in a tough position.  
Based on this evidence, critics have been very skeptical of France’s involvement 
in Rwanda. Linda Melvern argues that:   
The evidence against France was damming. France, of all the countries in the 
Security Council, possessed the most detailed knowledge of what was going on 
in Rwanda; the French had helped to arm the regime, and French soldiers were 
intimately involved with the Rwandan military, training the militia and helping to 
train the Presidential Guard. When the genocide began, French soldiers had 
helped to evacuate Hutu Power extremists, giving many of them, including 
Agathe Habyarimana, a military escort to the airport.77 
Furthermore, she adds, the findings at the French Embassy in Kigali were also suspect: 
“Five days after the 1994 genocide began, the French embassy in Kigali was abandoned. 
Left behind was a huge pile of shredded documents, almost filling a room.”78 Despite 
this evidence, Kroslak notes that “the French government still insists, despite the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that it bears no responsibility for the genocide in 
Rwanda . . . [and] has been at pains to stress that it was the only country that intervened 
and did anything during the genocide.”79 The evidence against France, however, is 
overwhelming.  
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In addition to the US and France, people concerned about where the weapons of 
genocide came from point fingers elsewhere. France certainly contributed a great deal of 
military support, but another significant contribution came from a different source. 
Melvern points out that in 1993: 
half a million machetes and other agricultural tools were purchased and 
distributed throughout the country, including hundreds of thousands of hoes, 
axes, hammers and razor blades. . . . The machetes came from China, supplied 
between 1992 and 1994 by a company called Oriental Machinery. . . . According 
to bank records, US$4.6 million was spent on agricultural equipment in 1993 by 
Rwandan companies not usually concerned with agricultural tools. . . . A total of 
US$725,669 was spent on 581,000 machetes; one machete for every third adult 
Hutu male.”80 
In other words, virtually all of Ngeze’s “weapons . . . to conquer the Inyenzi once and for 
all” came from the same source, a manufacturer in China. The import of over half a 
million machetes over such a short period of time should have set off some alarms; 
sadly, this was not the case. Disturbingly, the primary weapons of this genocide cost a 
little over $1 apiece. If critics point fingers at the United States and France, then perhaps 
they should point them at China as well. 
Yet the blame game does not stop at state governments; a great deal of it has also 
been directed at the UN. Michael Barnett, a former officer of the US Mission to the UN 
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argues that “the UN bears some moral responsibility for the genocide.”81 One criticism 
of the UN comes from its decision to withdraw most of its forces once the genocide had 
begun. Barnett explains that “there were twenty-five hundred United Nations 
peacekeepers on the ground, and indeed, soon after the killing began, the UN’s force 
commander, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, pleaded for a well-equipped battalion to 
stop the slaughter. Yet the UN immediately ordered its forces not to protect civilians.”82 
Through a combination of reaction to the militia’s ambush of ten Belgian peacekeepers 
and the noncommittal attitudes of several individual member states, the UN decided to 
withdraw all but 270 of its peacekeepers in Rwanda, a force far too small to complete the 
task of keeping the peace. 
Barnett points out that “many decisionmakers have claimed ignorance, insisting 
that the situation was highly uncertain,”83 yet he argues that many of these claims do not 
hold up under close examination. In response, he finds fault with both the bureaucratic 
structure of the UN and, more importantly, the individuals who use that structure to 
exempt themselves from moral responsibility. He argues that “their excuses point to a 
troubling truth: the larger and more complex the organization, the more difficult it is to 
recover individual responsibility. A nearly bottomless history of small decisions amassed 
to make a particular outcome almost inevitable.”84 Influenced by Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the “banality of evil,” Barnett is troubled that individuals have come to blame a 
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“bureaucracy [that] is best understood as ‘the Rule of nobody.’”85 If no one is to blame 
and the ills are projected onto a system larger than the individuals that compose it, then 
the same problems can continue to occur.   
At the same time, Barnett concedes that the UN has many consequences to 
consider when placed in tough situations: 
[T]he UN is a multidimensional, not a unidimensional, ethical space. Underlying 
any indictment of the UN is the presumption that it had a moral responsibility to 
stop the genocide, a duty to aid and protect the innocents. . . . [T]he UN, like all 
institutions, assumes at any single moment a multitude of responsibilities and 
obligations. . . . The UN had responsibilities not only to Rwandans but also to 
UN personnel who were at risk in the field and to the integrity of an institution 
that might be severely damaged by another Somalia-like failure in the field.86 
However, these alternate commitments and concerns are unsatisfactory given that the 
UN could have done more to prevent or slow the genocide.  
In particular, one problem that Barnett identifies is a lack of consensus within the 
organization: 
As a collection of related units and subunits, the UN contains subcultures that 
have distinct interpretations of how the rules and standards of appropriateness 
can and should be applied. Hardly synchronized in their movements or thoughts, 
the Secretariat, the council, and the field can have very different ideas about what 
is appropriate, how they should prioritize their commitments and responsibilities, 
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and what constitutes an acceptable level of risk. These three UN elements 
disagree among themselves over the meaning of neutrality, impartiality, and 
consent—disagreements that have their roots in rival interpretations of recent 
history and present circumstances.87 
Although consensus itself can sometimes be a problem, lack of consensus among leaders 
within the UN can translate into the withholding of key information and stalled 
negotiations. 
 A second problem that he identifies is the mystery of how the UN operates and 
the distance it maintains from even well-informed and well-educated members of the 
international public. In the search for moral responsibility, Barnett points out that: 
Investigators have struggled to understand how an institution shaped by the 
Genocide Convention, one that had peacekeepers on the ground from start to 
finish, could stand by and do nothing. Their searches involve a desire to know 
not only how this was possible but also who was to blame. As they attempt to 
draw back the Oz-like curtain of the ‘United Nations,’ a curtain that concealed 
the individuals who contributed to the decision not to intervene, they discovered 
a highly complicated story of individuals who knew too little and too much, of 
individuals who leaned on well-established precedents they acted meekly in 
response to possible threats, and of a UN that functioned effortlessly to 
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coordinate the desire of states and UN staff to remain uninvolved. Blame seemed 
so widely distributed that it proved nearly impossible to recover.88 
Indeed, the “Oz-like curtain” Barnett describes is one of the reasons why its members 
can hide from responsibility. 
An additional problem that critics have raised is the role of member states rather 
than individual UN employees. They argue that “we must recognize that the United 
Nations and other international institutions are made up of national governments whose 
primary concern is the retention of political support from their domestic constituencies.” 
If government officials fear involvement in international conflicts, then they will find 
ways to justify nonintervention. “Consequently,” they add, “the key to mobilizing 
international support is to first garner domestic support.”89 Of course, creating domestic 
support is easier said than done, but, as I will explain later, it may be justifiable if leaders 
emphasize long-term, rather than short-term, consequences. 
Amidst all of the international finger-pointing, however, it is important not to 
lose sight of the local context and the role of individual Rwandans discussed in the 
previous chapter. Although the international community certainly could have done 
things differently, its role in the genocide remains secondary to the role of the 
genocidaires in Rwanda. As US State Department Political Advisor Tony Marley points 
out, “the primary responsibility lies within the Rwandans themselves. The international 
community was not killing Rwandans, it was Rwandan killing Rwandan.”90 The limited 
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international response to the Rwandan genocide certainly did not help matters, and 
hindsight makes it easy to imagine how things could have unfolded differently; however, 
the international community’s reaction to genocide in Rwanda must be understood as 
exactly that—a reaction—to actions that were premeditated and implemented on a very 
large scale. 
Keeping this focus in mind, my goal here is not to add to the finger-pointing and 
blame but rather to contribute to a larger conversation about lessons that the international 
community can learn from what happened in Rwanda. One of the consistent lessons that 
emerges from this finger-pointing is the refusal to call Rwanda what it was: genocide. 
The 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as: 
any part of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members 
of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.91  
Although this definition might seem clear, sufficient, and relatively straightforward, 
those who want to get around it can, and, as the international community’s response to 
Rwanda shows, do. As Power argues, this definition contains some inherent weaknesses: 
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‘Genocide,’ as defined in the UN treaty, suffered then (as it suffers now) from . . 
. what might be called a numbers problem. On the question of how many 
individuals have to be killed and/or expelled from their homes in order for mass 
murder or ethnic cleansing to amount to genocide, there is—and can be—no 
consensus. If the law were to require a pre-specified percentage of killings before 
outsiders responded, perpetrators would be granted a free reign up to a dastardly 
point. The law would be little use if it kicked in only when a group had been 
entirely or largely eliminated. By focusing on the perpetrators’ intentions and 
whether they were attempting to destroy a collective, the law’s drafters thought 
that they might ensure that diagnosis of and action against genocide would not 
come too late. The broader, intent-based definition was essential if statesmen 
hoped to nip the crime in the bud.”92 
Although the broader definition might be more inclusive, it allows people to interpret the 
definition’s meaning on their own terms and for their own purposes. 
 Flexible interpretation of the Genocide Convention explains how leaders justified 
nonintervention in Rwanda. With careful use of language, world leaders frequently 
borrowed ideas from the Genocide Convention’s definition to describe what was 
happening in Rwanda but in a way that strategically avoided labeling the killings as 
“genocide.” This failure to call Rwanda a genocide has been a large part of the charge 
against the US. As Melvern recounts, “in Washington every attempt was being made to 
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avoid the word genocide.”93 This charge is not an exaggeration, nor was this effort 
unintentional.  Several US government officials have suggested that they knew the 
killings in Rwanda constituted genocide but that their colleagues did not want to 
intervene. As one State Department official recalls:  
After two weeks [following the April 6 assassination of President Habyarimana] 
we knew that this was a systematic effort to exterminate Tutsi, this was a 
genocide. I was reluctant to draw such a conclusion because we didn’t know 
enough yet, and we didn’t know enough of the details. We just knew that a hell-
of-a-lot of people were being killed. By April 21, 22, 23, we were certain that 
this was genocide.94 
Despite this recognition by some officials in the State Department, others refused to 
label this killing as a genocide because this finding would have international legal and 
political consequences that would compel the US to act. Consequently, those who did 
not want to intervene searched for legal loopholes. One released government document 
even said to “be careful” with “language that calls for an international investigation of 
human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention” because a 
“genocide finding could commit USG [United States Government] to actually ‘do 
something.’95 Rather than calling the killing “genocide,” lawyers urged officials to use 
the watered-down term, “acts of genocide.” As Cohen explains: 
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The Secretary of State was assured that ‘a USG [U.S. Government] statement 
that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal 
consequences. It was believed that ‘acts of genocide’ is different than ‘genocide’ 
in that the former implies that only some of the actions fit the Genocide 
Convention definition of ‘genocide,’ while the latter implies that a coordinated 
campaign is underway. Therefore, ‘acts of genocide’ is considered less severe 
because it does not imply that the violence as a whole is genocide.96 
This loophole allowed the US to express some concern about the events in Rwanda 
without being compelled to act. 
 Of course, the use of “acts of genocide” in place of “genocide” left many people 
dissatisfied and uneasy. A conversation between Christine Shelly from the US State 
Department and Alan Elsner exemplifies this discomfort:  
Elsner: What’s the difference between ‘acts of genocide’ and ‘genocide’? 
Shelly: Well, I think the—as you know, there’s a legal definition of this. . . . 
Clearly not all of the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to 
which you might apply that label. . . . But as to the distinctions between the 
words, we’re trying to call what we have seen so far as best as we can; and based, 
again, on the evidence, we have every reason to believe that acts of genocide 
have occurred. 
Elsner: How many acts of genocide does it take to make a genocide? 
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Shelly: Alan, that’s just not a question that I’m in a position to answer.97 
Given the broad language of the Genocide Convention, that may be a question that 
nobody is “in a position to answer.” Of course, the answer could just as easily be “one.” 
Nevertheless, on a pure semantic level, the use of “acts of genocide” in place of 
“genocide” apparently meant enough to avoid commitment. As Marley explains, “those 
that wanted nothing done didn’t even want to acknowledge the fact that it could be 
genocide because that would weaken their argument that nothing should be done.”98 Not 
calling the events in Rwanda a genocide allowed the US to shirk from responsibilities. 
In addition to the US, however, leaders at the UN also refused to call the events 
in Rwanda a genocide. When New Zealand Ambassador Colin Keating proposed that the 
UN should label the killing in Rwanda as genocide, British Ambassador David Hannay 
objected. Hannay “argued that were the statement to be used in an official UN 
document, then the Council would become a ‘laughing stock’. To name this a genocide 
and not to act on it would be ridiculous.”99 Consequently, Keating redrafted his 
statement to avoid using the word “genocide.” The new proposal affirmed that: 
The Security Council condemns all the breaches of international humanitarian 
law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and 
recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually 
responsible. The Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic 
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group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part 
constitutes a crime punishable by international law.100  
In other words, “the word ‘genocide would not be used, but the definition would 
remain.”101 The UN, like the US, virtually called the killing in Rwanda a genocide in 
order to condemn it but found a loophole that would allow it to do so without the 
compulsion to intervene. 
 These case studies leave those who wish to prevent genocide with a painful 
irony; that is, as Cohen observes, “that a convention that was designed to have diction 
used to encourage states to intervene actually became the most valuable tool for nations 
to justify not intervening.”102 Through avoidance of the term “genocide,” governments 
and other institutions manipulated the letter of the law to avoid, as the released State 
Department document says, “commit[ting] . . . to actually ‘do something’” about it. This 
avoidance, however, also violated the spirit of the law. In order to take genocide 
prevention seriously, world leaders must be comfortable using the Genocide Convention 
for its intended purpose.  
A second area of criticism from Rwanda, and one that more directly relates to 
incitement, is that the US and other nations did not utilize the option to jam the radio. If 
media executives use hate radio as a catalyst for genocidal intent, then interrupting the 
radio might slow or even stop a genocide. Indeed, one reason why RTLM worked as 
well as it did was that it had no competition. As noted in the previous chapter, “there 
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were no broadcasts by third parties to the conflict urging Hutu villagers to defend their 
Tutsi friends and neighbors, to offer them refuge, or to combat the myth that the RPF 
were executing a genocide against Hutu Rwandese.103 A broadcast like this would 
support Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous assertion that “if there be a time 
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.”104 Perhaps with a multiplicity of viewpoints and with warnings to those 
involved in the genocide, fewer people would have taken up machetes and other 
weapons.   
 Nevertheless, no such broadcasts existed. In the absence of alternative 
viewpoints and in the presence of desperate times, censorship may be a feasible option. 
Even Brandeis, directly after he made the making the previous claim, conceded that 
“only an emergency can justify repression.”105 The mass killing by the interahamwe 
could easily constitute such an emergency, and this link opens up the possibility of a 
radio jam. Indeed, the US State Department considered three options of jamming the 
radio in Rwanda: “(1) Transmit counterpropaganda from a US aircraft with 
Loudspeakers, (2) Block Radio Rwanda and RTLM from broadcasting their Messages, 
and (3) Destroy the radio antennas.”106 With a link between RTLM broadcasts and the 
actions of the militia, these options could have slowed or even put a stop to the killing on 
the ground. 
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  However, US State Department officials considered but ultimately rejected all 
three options. Even “before the genocide,” Monroe Price points out, “NGOs sought US 
assistance in jamming as a preventative measure. Though knowledgeable State 
Department officials agreed with the need, requests were denied on the ground that 
jamming went against the principles of freedom of expression and respect for national 
sovereignty.”107 This logic endured even once the genocide was underway. 
According to Des Forges, “at the height of the genocide, the response was that Rwanda 
is a sovereign state, the airwaves belong to that sovereign state and we cannot intervene. 
Sovereignty became an instrument for not doing something.”108 Consequently, RTLM’s 
influence remained unchecked. 
 In the aftermath of the genocide, some scholars have questioned the US 
government’s decision not to intervene. For example, in an article in the American 
Journal of International Law, Jamie Frederic Metzl traces the main arguments the US 
used against radio jamming: 
There are three main reasons why the United States Government chose not to jam 
Rwandese radio broadcasts, as it clearly had the power to do. First, it would have 
been practically very difficult and potentially very expensive. Second, in the 
aftermath of the perceived debacle in Somalia in which eighteen U.S. servicemen 
were killed, intervention in obscure African countries, apparently for little direct 
national benefit, was expected to be politically unpopular. . . . [Third,] 
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government lawyers asked to consider the issue apparently concluded that 
jamming was illegal under international telecommunications law and 
international conventions regarding the freedoms of information and expression 
and was a violation of states’ sovereign rights.109 
However, when put to the test, these arguments against radio jamming do not hold up 
very well. For starters, the concern about a repeat of Somalia is likely a false analogy, as 
(1) the operation would be a fight against technology more than the militia itself and (2) 
it could easily be explained if it were to succeed. To the concerns about cost and 
international law, Metzl concedes that “jamming a small mobile transmitter from such an 
airplane . . . would have been extremely expensive and highly visible . . . [and] jamming 
from the ground . . . would have required a strong energy source to power the blocking 
devices, as well as permission to operate from local leaders.”110 However, he adds, the 
international prohibitions on radio jamming could “be superseded by action authorized 
by the UN Security Council as a Chapter VII response to a “threat to international peace 
and security.111 Moreover, the benefit of saving human lives should, on its own, 
outweigh the costs associated with a radio jam; however, if that logic is insufficient on 
its own, then Rusesabagina points out that the “U.S. aid package [given to refugees after 
the genocide] totaled more than sixteen times what it would have taken to electronically 
jam the hate radio.” In short, none of the arguments against jamming RTLM hold up. 
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 Metzl makes a good case for the US to at least consider the option of a radio jam. 
However, he does not argue that the U.S. should use radio jamming whenever it desires. 
Instead, Metzl argues that “a narrow exception to the general international standard 
supporting the free flow of information should be established for clear cases of 
incitement to genocide where the occurrence of that genocide appears imminent.”112 
To determine when such action would be appropriate, he proposes an international 
standard based on established free speech traditions in the US and Canada: 
The Brandenburg standard, which allows expression to be curtailed when it 
incites or produces ‘imminent lawless action,’ and section 319 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, which criminalizes ‘inciting hatred against any identifiable group 
where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace,’ provide useful 
models for a standard that might be appropriate. Because a high standard of proof 
is required to limit free speech under Brandenburg or to apply section 319, 
successful prosecutions dependent on these standards have been extremely rare. 
Elevated to the international plane, both Brandenburg and the Canadian code 
would seem to parallel a strict system that penalizes incitement to imminent mass 
violence or genocide and, in doing so, authorizes and justifies responsive action 
including jamming.”113 
This logic, which would limit the acceptable use of radio jamming to very particular 
circumstances, would grant members of the international community permission to act in 
limited situations in which it is likely that speech will result in mass violence. 
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 Furthermore, this discussion of the power to jam technology should not be 
limited to radio. Since the Rwandan genocide, internet technology has, for better or 
worse, provided a new tool through which information can be transmitted quickly, 
publicly, and even anonymously. Although the technology itself may be neutral and 
although it provides a multiplicity of viewpoints as a whole, it also could very well 
become a tool used to plan mass violence and genocide. Accordingly, there may come a 
time when it would be appropriate to censor part or all of the internet.  
 So far, this discussion has led to some significant conclusions. First, although 
many critics have played the blame game to figure out who should bear responsibility 
for the Rwandan genocide, their finger-pointing is only useful insofar as future 
generations can learn from their mistakes. Second, a major obstacle to the international 
community’s handling of the Rwandan genocide was its failure to call it by its rightful 
name, genocide. Albright and Cohen argue that in order to try to prevent genocide, the 
international community must be willing to use the Genocide Convention as originally 
intended. As they argue, “invoking the word genocide . . . has unmatched rhetorical 
power. The dilemma is how to harness the power of the word to motivate and mobilize 
while not allowing debates about its definition or application to constrain or distract 
policymakers from addressing the core problems it describes.”114 This task, they admit, 
is not easy, but it is essential. 
 Third, in conjunction with identification of genocide, the international 
community must recognize and take advantage of its options for preventing genocide. 
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One such option, particularly in identifiable cases of incitement, is to find ways to jam 
technology. Although it may be costly and objectionable to those who support free 
speech, this option can disrupt the organization and execution of mass killing. The world 
will never know how many lives could have been saved if RTLM could no longer 
broadcast its messages; however, it is reasonable to assume that a radio jam would have 
helped. 
 The primary obstacles to intervention identified here include the commitment of 
money and military personnel. However, these commitments need not (and probably 
should not) be unilateral. If these costs explain why leaders of countries and 
international organizations do not want to intervene, Albright and Cohen accuse those 
who take the passive route of shortsightedness. They argue that the costs of non- or 
delayed intervention result in greater costs, as “genocide and mass atrocities . . . feed on 
and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states, with dangerous spillover effects that 
know no boundaries.”115 These “spillover effects,” they say, include “[political] 
instability . . . terrorist recruitment and training, human trafficking, and civil strife . . . 
refugee flows . . . [and growth in] humanitarian needs . . . And the longer we wait to act, 
the more exorbitant the price tag.”116 Using Rwanda as a prime example, they argue that: 
The economic costs of intervention are always higher once mass atrocities are 
underway. More than fifteen years after the Rwandan Genocide ended, the 
spillover of mass atrocities into the DRC continues to set back the progress of 
peace and security in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The Mission of the Congo 
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(MONUC) has the largest annual peacekeeping budget in the world, exceeding 
US$1.4 billion in 2009. The United States’ share of the MONUC budget was 
estimated at approximately US$300 million in 2008.117 
Thus, if leaders are concerned about the political ramifications of serious financial and 
military commitments, they should think about and emphasize the long-term 
consequences of nonintervention. 
Despite Marley’s claim that “the international community was not killing 
Rwandans,” the rest of the world certainly could have done more to make the situation 
better. Moreover, if Albright and Cohen are correct in their assessments of post-
genocidal consequences, it would have been in the best interests of the international 
community to do everything in its power to prevent, or at least intervene in, genocide. 
Despite the events that took place in Rwanda, there is some hope that through self-
reflection, the international community can change how it responds to the problem of 
genocide. 
In a 1998 speech in Kigali, former President Clinton exemplified some of this 
hope. Although his speech may have fallen on deaf ears in Rwanda, given that his 
remarks came four years after his administration abandoned the idea of intervention, it 
contains a message of remorse and reflection for the international community. Looking 
toward the future, Clinton argues that: 
[T]here is only one crucial division among the peoples of the Earth. And believe 
me, after over 5 years of dealing with these problems, I know it is not the 
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divisions between Hutu and Tutsi or Serb and Croatian; and Muslim and Bosnian 
or Arab and Jew; or Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, or black and white. It is 
really the line between those who embrace the common humanity we all share 
and those who reject it.”118 
Furthermore, he admits that: 
The international community . . . did not act quickly enough after the killing 
began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for 
the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: 
genocide. We cannot change the past, but we can and must do everything in our 
power to help you build a future without fear and full of hope.”119 
Indeed, the best future the international community can provide for Rwanda is one that 
learns from the mistakes of the past. To fail to do so is to turn its back on Rwanda a 
second time. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“IMPERFECT MECHANISMS . . . YET WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?”: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INCITEMENT 
 
In addition to questions about how to prevent genocide, or how to halt it once it 
is underway, important questions also arise in the aftermath of genocides that have 
already occurred. Although there are many important questions that warrant attention 
after the fact (for example, how to best help individual survivors cope with their grief 
and continue living their daily lives), broader socio-political questions about how to 
rebuild societies that have been torn apart may be of particular interest to scholars of 
rhetoric, history, and law. For example, some of these questions might include: Is it 
possible to restore order out of chaos? Should those who orchestrate and perpetrate 
genocide be held responsible for their actions, and if so, how? Is the law an effective 
way to bring about justice? If so, what legal system(s) are best for handling crimes as 
large and severe as genocide? What constitutes an appropriate punishment for genocide-
related crimes? These are not easy questions, and they likely do not have easy answers; 
nevertheless, they are too important to dismiss. 
Questions like these have been pivotal for Rwanda since 1994. As Nicholas 
Jones explains: 
The aftermath of the genocide left Rwanda, a country among the poorest in the 
world, in a state of ruin and turmoil that was highlighted by insecurity. The 
necessity for the maintenance of peace and the establishment of personal 
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security—to an acceptable level, allowing for the advancement of policies and 
programmes designed to seek justice and hence reconciliation—was of the 
utmost concern.120 
In Rwanda, as in many post-genocidal countries, life after death has not been easy. 
An important question in the aftermath of genocide is whether any legal system, 
particularly an international legal system, is an appropriate way to respond to those who 
commit genocide. Within the legal tradition, , it seems that the only appropriate way to 
respond to crimes that cannot be resolved at one level is to take them to a higher level; 
by this logic, crimes that transcend national laws would naturally go to a larger 
international legal system. In other words, crimes committed by a state, across 
international borders, or by a system too large for a state’s judicial system to handle 
would require an international court to resolve disputes. 
Skeptics of this tradition might raise important objections here, however. First, 
with many different legal systems throughout the world, a unified international system 
can be exclusive. Second, if the UN contributed to the problems in Rwanda, what gives 
it the authority to adjudicate the crime? Third, if the international court is the highest 
living form of justice, then what happens if it makes mistakes? Because of its supreme 
power, it may be tempting to think of the international legal system as a universal and 
unquestionable authority. It is important to remember, however, that the international 
legal system, like any legal system, is not infallible. Indeed, law and justice are not 
perfect, and too much reverence for the law can be dangerous insofar as the law 
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privileges certain voices over others, convicts the innocent, exonerates the guilty, and 
resists change and flexibility. As such, it is necessary to recognize that operations within 
the legal system at any level are, as Kurt Saunders has argued, “rhetorical, practical, and 
culturally constructed.”121 Keeping in mind the argumentative features that guide the 
creation and enforcement of law, recognition of the potential flaws in the legal system 
introduces humility into the law’s interpretation and application. 
Furthermore, as “practical” entities, legal systems generally have to operate 
under conditions of at least some uncertainty, and uncertainty is, for many people, 
uncomfortable. Indeed, given the hatred toward accused genocidaires and the severity of 
punishment likely to accompany convictions for crimes of war and genocide, there is at 
least some concern about the rights of the accused to a fair trial. However, as Wayne 
Booth argued, “Nobody ever gives equal weight to every voice. What satisfies us in 
practice, though the practice always can and should be refined, is the discovery that a 
given belief that fits our own structures of perception and belief is supported by those 
qualified to know,”122 in this case, lawyers who have proven their merits elsewhere. This 
reasoning can provide some confidence in international law. Meanwhile, it is also 
important to note that the ICTR has acquitted and released some of the accused and 
includes an appeals process. 
Furthermore, despite the potential flaws of international law, its supporters 
defend it on a number of grounds. For example, in A Moral Theory of Political 
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Reconciliation, Colleen Murphy argues that “a primary task of political reconciliation . . 
. is to cultivate a mutual respect for the rule of law.”123 Although the law itself may be 
imperfect, Murphy argues that an international justice system can foster stability and 
protect individuals from the abuses of governments and other organizations: 
The rule of law is instrumentally valuable . . . because in practice it limits the 
kinds of injustice that governments could pursue. Thus the erosion of the rule of 
law is morally concerning and damaging to political relations, insofar as it entails 
an erosion of important conditions for relationships to express reciprocity and 
respect for agency, and creates an environment conducive to injustice.124 
Similarly, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu points out that international law can be a tool by 
which to unify a deeply divided society through reconciliation. In his view, it is 
“precisely because international criminal justice addresses mass crimes, which inevitably 
dislocate societies, [that] its ultimate aim is to heal fractured societies and help establish 
peace and reconciliation by addressing the root cause of such destabilization—
impunity.125 Although the process may not be easy or direct, international justice can 
help fractured societies come back together when the future looks bleak. 
Long-standing international conflicts can sometimes create the illusion that those 
involved will never make peace. However, examples like the process of Truth and 
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Reconciliation in South Africa demonstrate the possibilities of such moves toward 
reunification in the face of skepticism and uncertainty. As Erik Doxtader points out: 
South Africa is now an international symbol of reconciliation. A source of 
tremendous surprise and inspiration in the global community, the transition from 
apartheid has been taken as evidence of reconciliation’s power and a basic 
indicator of its values for countries struggling to overcome legacies of deep 
division. Indeed, the form of South Africa’s turn to democracy has played a key 
role in moving the concept of reconciliation from the margin to the centre of 
debates over how conflict-torn societies can redress the costs of violence, support 
democratisation, and promote the protection of human rights.126 
Furthermore, Doxtader adds, the process by which reconciliation occurs should be of 
interest to rhetorical scholars and historians: 
 [T]he history of reconciliation is held in a host of words that announce, trouble, 
and constitute the work of history-making. Far more than a law or commission 
that proceeded its name, reconciliation took shape with(in) words, a varied set of 
calls, arguments, and deliberations in which speech about reconciliation defined 
the contours of its practice and performed its work of (re)turning and (re)figuring 
the form (and content) of human (inter)action. Found in the midst of violence 
that appears to breach the very conditions of creative expression, the matter of 
reconciliation’s role in South Africa’s transition is the rhetorical question of its 
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unfolding and enfolding capacity to invent the power of speech from within 
moments of its apparent foreclosure.127 
Because of its rhetorical and constitutive power, the process of reconciliation helped to 
reestablish unity when many doubted that it would be possible to do so. Although the 
TRC took a different approach from the ICTR, the context was not one of genocide. In a 
similar manner, however, international criminal courts also possess the capacity to 
reopen discussion even when dialogue seems virtually impossible. 
In addition to offering the hope of reconciliation, international law holds 
important implications for public memory. In regions torn by years of heated conflict, 
vernacular historical accounts can easily break down into competing histories of “us vs. 
them.”  Although it is important to recognize the value of vernacular challenges to 
dominant historical narratives, it is equally important to recognize that alternative 
accounts can be co-opted by groups who wish to continue to promote violence and 
hatred (say, by self-proclaimed “revisionist historians” who deny the Holocaust). As 
Murphy points out:  
Denial is a source of concern in transitional contexts. The changes required to 
rebuild political relationships in ways that support capabilities, the rule of law, 
and reasonable political trust depend on cooperative efforts among both 
individuals and citizens. Denial and resistance from either citizens or officials 
may undermine the ability of transitional societies to work toward such change. . 
. . Official forms of acknowledgement are a direct way to counteract official 
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denial. They can often also set the stage for countering denial among citizens 
insofar as they change the contours of public discussion and debate, and 
influence public discourse.128 
In this regard, a more officially recognized form of history within the particular context 
of transitional justice may be useful in order to break the style of they-said-we-said 
interpretations of conflicts that typically perpetuate violence. Similarly, Martti Ahtisaari 
points out that international trials can have a healing power. “A criminal trial brings past 
suffering into the public arena,” he argues. “It may thus enable a victimized community 
to deal with trauma and, perhaps, to create the conditions for future social life.129 This 
historical function of the international justice system offers a point of departure from 
previously intractable conflicts. 
 Keeping these arguments in mind, the “Media Trial” at the ICTR makes a 
fascinating and complex case study that exemplifies many of the greatest strengths and 
weaknesses of the burgeoning international legal system. To render a pure value 
judgment of the trial as effective or ineffective is to miss a great number of contextual 
factors and nuances. Consequently, I will lay out some of the cases for both sides here, 
beginning with the positive case.  
Several aspects of the ICTR and its handling of this trial showed great potential. 
For starters, as an international body, the ICTR successfully captured, tried, and 
convicted these three men. These were not easy tasks, given that Nahimana, 
                                                 
128 Murphy, A Moral Theory: 129-30. 
129 Martti Ahtisaari, "Justice and Acountability: Local or International," in From Sovereign Impunity to 
International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Peter 
Malcontent (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2004), xv-xvi. 
 71 
Barayagwiza, and Ngeze had all fled the country after the genocide. The ICTR likely 
succeeded where Rwanda would have struggled if forced to undertake this mission 
alone. As discussed in the previous chapter, the problems that exist in the aftermath of 
genocide extend far beyond just the number of people killed. Aside from mass killings, 
genocides often lead to mass emigration of both the innocent and the guilty. 
Consequently, the legal and political systems of countries affected by genocide 
may not be left well equipped to handle the heavy burdens of finding, capturing, 
detaining, and trying high-level criminals outside of their borders. In the aftermath of the 
genocide, Rwanda’s legal system lay in ruins. Carroll notes that “out of the 800 lawyers 
and judges of the national and provincial courts, only 40 were alive and in the country 
after July 1994. Thus, an international tribunal was needed to begin prosecuting 
offenders while the Rwandan government rebuilt the domestic judicial system.”130 UN 
jurisdiction over the crimes committed in Rwanda helped take some pressure off of 
Rwanda’s legal system, which had been decimated by both the genocide itself and the 
subsequent mass exodus of refugees.  
Additionally, the ICTR aimed to create and reinforce messages of unity, 
reconciliation, and stability for a nation torn apart by both machetes and broken social 
relations. Consistent with Moghalu, Doxtader, Ahtisaari, and Murphy’s reflections on 
the purposes of international law, the ICTR helped to mitigate conflict. As Power 
explains, the ICTR helped to bring a divided people together: 
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[M]any tribunal staff . . . thought the proceedings were increasingly delivering 
messages essential to reconciliation. . . . [T]he perpetrators of genocide and 
crimes against humanity were being forced to appear before a court of law, 
where their self-serving arguments could be formally challenged. If Serbia’s 
Slobodan Milosevic and Rwanda’s Théoneste Bagosora once insisted that 
‘uncontrolled elements’ were carrying out the killings, the prosecutors at the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals had the opportunity to dismantle these claims, 
showing that these men were very much in control. The evidence proved that 
what were once called ‘failed states’ were in fact all too successful in 
implementing their designs.131  
International accountability helped ensure, to the best of the UN’s ability, that those who 
orchestrated the genocide in Rwanda would not go unpunished, an important step in 
helping the nation to come to terms with its history and to move forward. 
However, despite some of these accomplishments, the ICTR has also generated a 
long list of grievances. For starters, as Power points out, the tribunal might not have 
been called into existence without a sense of obligation to acknowledge Rwanda after 
Bosnia: 
It was a year after the Hague tribunal came into existence that Rwandan Hutu 
militants and their foot soldiers butchered some 800,000 of their Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu compatriots. With a UN court in place to hear charges related to 
the killing of some 200,000 Bosnians, it would have been politically prickly and 
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manifestly racist to allow impunity for the planners of the Rwandan slaughter, 
the most clear-cut case of genocide since the Holocaust.”132 
Power’s charge here is clear: Rwanda, a small African country of little strategic interest 
to many Western powers in comparison to the former Yugoslavia, had been off the radar 
while it occurred; without the UN’s previous establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, it may have remained that way.  
Even in the initial debates over the establishment of the tribunal, however, some 
important obstacles came up. The fourteen votes for the ICTR looked like a clear 
landslide compared the one vote against it. Ironically, however, the one dissenting vote 
came from Rwanda itself. As Temple-Raston recounts, “seven months after the genocide 
had begun, in November 1994, the [UN] Security Council voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of the tribunal plan, with the exception of one of its temporary members. Rwanda 
voted no.”133 Ironically, the tribunal would go through for the one country that opposed 
it. 
Why would Rwanda vote against the ICTR’s creation? Three significant issues 
complicated the creation of the tribunal. First, leaders at the UN demanded that the 
tribunal would not take place in Rwanda. Many Rwandans objected to the removal of the 
tribunal from their country. To do so would literally and figuratively distance the trial 
and its findings from the Rwandan people. However, the UN determined that “any trial 
in Rwanda of a high-level genocidaire, or genocide mastermind, would be, by definition, 
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unfair.”134 Perhaps so. Nevertheless, despite the wishes of many Rwandans, the UN 
strategically placed the ICTR in an obvious foreign site: Arusha, Tanzania, the site of the 
former peace accords between the Habyarimana government and the RPF.  
Although Arusha was a logical choice for the court to reinforce a message of 
peace and reconciliation, the physical distance of the court from Rwanda also created an 
emotional distance from the tribunal. As Power observes:  
Citizens in Rwanda and Bosnia paid almost no attention to the court proceedings. 
Israelis recall the days when they huddled around their radios to hear for the first 
time the details of Nazi horrors, whereas Bosnians and Rwandans just shrug 
when the courts are mentioned. They are deemed irrelevant to their daily lives. 
Ignorance is rife.”135 
Although the ICTR tried to provide closure for the Rwandan nation, many Rwandans 
found it difficult to follow trials that took place on foreign soil.  
 Second, Rwandans expressed concerns about who would have jurisdiction over 
the tribunal. Even though placing the trial in Rwanda easily could be unfair, Rwandans 
worried that UN jurisdiction could be equally unfair. The Rwandan ambassador 
expressed concern that “judges from certain states (like France and Belgium) would be 
biased . . . [and] would only appease the conscience of the international community 
rather than respond to the expectations of the Rwandan people.”136 Although this 
problem had an easier fix—choosing Norwegian Judge Erik Møse and Sri Lankan 
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judges Navanethem Pillay and Asoka de Zoysa Gunawardana—the problem of who 
would preside over the hearings was a cause for concern and an important one to 
address. 
 These issues, however, were not the most important reason behind the Rwandan 
ambassador’s objection. A larger concern for many Rwandans consisted of the UN’s 
refusal to allow the option of the death penalty for those whom the ICTR found guilty. 
Rwandan courts allowed this option, and, “without the possibility of a death penalty, the 
Rwandan ambassador said, his nation couldn’t support it.”137 Ironically, when the UN 
granted Rwanda power over lower-level cases through the gacaca court system, it meant 
that many of the leaders and organizers of the genocide received long sentences or life in 
prison while Rwandan national and gacaca courts have put many lower-level 
perpetrators to death. UN jurisdiction over the high-level cases thus inhibited Rwanda’s 
ability to try its own criminals on its own terms and on its own soil. 
 The questions surrounding the ICTR’s initial establishment, however, only 
marked the beginning of problems that the tribunal would face. Shortly after its creation, 
the ICTR learned that tracking down and bringing the accused to Arusha would not be 
easy. As previously mentioned, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze all fled the country 
after the genocide. Nahimana and Barayagwiza were arrested in Cameroon, but 
President Paul Biya delayed their release until 1996; Ngeze was captured in Egypt, but 
not until 1997. Furthermore, their alleged co-conspirator, Félicien Kabuga, remains at 
large nearly twenty years after the genocide. To be sure, Rwanda acting alone would likely 
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have a harder time tracking down fugitives; nevertheless, finding and prosecuting those 
involved with the genocide has been challenging even with an international court. 
 Furthermore, since its establishment, the ICTR’s work has been neither quick nor 
easy. Carroll points out that “the ICTR has suffered from a number of physical, legal, 
and procedural impediments that have led to delays.”138 Particularly since the UN 
created the tribunal from scratch, it has been slow and costly. Furthermore, several 
complications have made much of the process unstable, even to several points at which it 
nearly collapsed entirely. As Temple-Raston points out: 
The process, it was clear, was going to be slow in spite of the fact that this was a 
court running against the clock. There was a deadline on this tribunal. It would 
meet until 2006 and then its money would run out, the United Nations had said. It 
was as if on that date all the justice available for Rwanda would be dispensed and 
when the appointed hour struck, everyone would go home.139 
The 2006 deadline has come and gone, but the ICTR did not cease its work as projected; 
as of December 2011, the court’s “trial work is expected to be finished by June 2012 and 
appeals work is on track to be completed by the end of 2014.”140 If that deadline is met, 
twenty years will have passed since the genocide occurred. 
One way that the ICTR has tried to speed up its process is through the 
reintroduction of Rwandan gacaca courts. As Jones explains: 
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The Gacaca represents a uniquely Rwandan response to the genocide. It is a 
modernized version of a traditional dispute resolution mechanism wherein people 
of the community who had a grievance would present it before the 
Inyangamugayo, and it would be discussed and a decision reached. . . . It is the 
task of these courts to encourage reconciliation and national unity while also 
attending to the processing of the remaining 760,000 genocide cases.141 
Nevertheless, this process, too, has been slow. In 2000, for example, Carroll noted that 
“if the Rwandan courts continued at their current pace, it would take 150 years to try all 
the accused.”142 Although this process is an innovative way to handle the lower-level 
perpetrators, it may not be fully equipped to handle the large number of accused 
criminals.  
 Meanwhile, the ICTR’s handling of bigger cases has not been easy. The process of 
bringing these men (especially Barayagwiza) to trial created legal challenges even after they 
were extradited to the court. As Temple-Raston notes: 
 When [Barayagwiza] finally arrived in Arusha, he cried foul. He had been held in 
jail in Cameroon for nearly a year without an indictment, he said, which was against 
international law and the bylaws of the ICTR. The former jurist demanded his own 
release. Sputtering about his unfair detention, he called the tribunal a farce.143 
Although his protest was likely just an attempt to get away scot-free, Barayagwiza’s 
criticism of the court was not completely unwarranted; in fact, his appeal of his 
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indictment ‘nearly resulted in his release before trial.”144 Even after it had 
Barayagwiza in custody, the court struggled to keep him detained.  
Barayagwiza’s story brings up an interesting challenge to criminal law; that is, when 
criminal law fails to meet its goal of retributive justice, it also can be counterproductive 
for its goal of reconciliation. As Moghalu notes: 
[R]ecording past injustice and creating the conditions for national reconciliation 
are not always best realized through criminal law. The available evidence, even 
of massive violations, may not always fulfil[l] the formal criteria of criminal 
accountability. . . . [A] criminal trial may not always be the best instrument for 
memory and healing—especially if the leader has to be released because of the 
lack of formal evidence.”145 
Had the court released Barayagwiza, particularly on technicalities related to his 
incarceration rather than for a lack of evidence for his crimes, it likely would have been 
highly counterproductive.  
 Additionally, Ngeze’s story also raises some interesting questions about the 
nature of the crime of incitement, particularly as it relates to timing. His lawyer, John 
Floyd III, expressed concern about the temporal delay between Ngeze’s words and the 
genocidaires’ actions. “Kangura wasn’t even published during the genocide,” Floyd 
noted, “so how can [Ngeze] be guilty of inciting it?”146 This question presented a tough 
challenge for the prosecution. 
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 Indeed, as with many trials, this one contained several moments of uncertainty. 
As Stephen Rapp, the lead prosecutor on the “media trial” case recalls: 
I remember that while making the closing argument I was afraid that the judges 
would decide that a person like Nahimana—who may never have gone near a 
roadblock during the killing, who certainly never raised a machete, and who 
likely saw very little or no bloodshed—was somehow less guilty than one of the 
thousands who had killed their neighbors with their own hands.147 
Nevertheless, Barayagwiza, Nahimana, and Ngeze eventually stood trial, and the ICTR 
unanimously convicted them of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
complicity in genocide, and two crimes against humanity.148 However, the slow pace of the 
tribunal’s proceedings added a temporal distance to the already established physical 
distance. Even though all three men were in custody by 1997, their trial did not begin until 
2001. Furthermore, the court did not deliver its sentence until December 3, 2003, nearly a 
decade after the genocide took place, and it granted them an appeal in 2007. Nevertheless, 
even though it took some time and energy, the court could at least claim that it had 
successfully captured, tried, and even convicted these three men.  
 As the first international media incitement trial since Nuremberg, the court’s ruling 
was both authoritative and controversial. Not surprisingly, given the quality and quantity of 
evidence, the court reaffirmed that incitement to genocide was a serious offense under 
international law. “The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values 
comes with great responsibility,” it declared. “Those who control such media are 
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accountable for its consequences.”149 Despite all of its complications, the ‘media trial’ 
managed to provide some closure for Rwanda—at least for those who were able to follow 
the story—and reopened legal questions that had not been addressed on an international 
level in more than fifty years. 
 The court’s 2003 ruling seemed like an end to a long and exhausting story; from a 
legal standpoint, however, it was only a beginning. Although it provided some closure for 
Rwanda, the trial asks more legal questions than it answers. In particular, it questions 
traditional assumptions about incitement, media ethics, the international legal system, and 
free speech. It challenges the UN to define the concept of incitement and to determine who 
should have jurisdiction in applicable cases; moreover, it tests the limits of free speech. 
One question that the “media trial” leaves unresolved is the question of local and 
international jurisdiction. To be sure, the situation in late 1994 left little choice between 
local and international jurisdiction. Additionally, taking an international approach to 
questions of incitement does have its benefits. For example, as Carroll suggests, the threat of 
international justice might deter individuals from committing crimes: 
 The ICTR, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
other criminal tribunals, could deter future international humanitarian law violations 
by sending the message to individuals that the international community will step in 
and hold those guilty of serious human rights violations accountable for their 
actions.150 
For Rwanda, in particular, scholars have argued that the lack of messages about international 
consequences to counter the RTLM’s propaganda contributed to people’s willingness to 
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partake in the genocide. By this logic, if the UN consistently takes incitement to genocide 
cases to an international court, it makes a clear and consistent threat of prosecution to both 
senders and recipients of messages of incitement. 
 Furthermore, as the Rwandan genocide demonstrates, a country’s legal system may 
not be equipped to handle cases of incitement or other genocidal crimes in the aftermath of 
widespread killings and mass exodus of refugees. Thus, international jurisdiction may be the 
only viable option. Moreover, even though it took significant amounts of time and energy 
the ICTR successfully brought Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, and many others to court, 
whereas Rwanda might have struggled to do so if left completely to its own devices. 
Therefore, international jurisdiction shows some promise. 
At the same time, an international approach also might be problematic, so there may 
be good reason to maintain at least elements of local jurisdiction. For starters, by holding 
long, drawn-out trials from remote locations, international courts risk unfairness to the 
accused and, more importantly, a lost sense of urgency, immediacy, care, and closure for the 
victims. Additionally, international courts might undermine local legal customs, such as 
Rwandan support for the death penalty in extreme cases; therefore, they might upset the very 
people whom they aim to help. Therefore, as May argues, the international community may 
need to listen more carefully to local concerns:  
[W]hen international courts make such pronouncements of condemnation, the effect 
on various societies will depend on how much moral authority is bestowed on these 
courts by the members of the society in question. This is one good reason to make 
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sure that international courts and tribunals are established with maximal support, 
rather than to be resented by the folks back home.151  
In this regard, the UN may need to reassess some of the concerns Rwandans expressed as it 
deals with future cases. 
Meanwhile, despite some of the problems of the ICTR, it still accomplished 
many important goals. Furthermore, as the international legal system is still in a nascent 
stage, it provides hope for the future. As Moghalu argues: 
There are few perfect options for confronting impunity and effecting 
reconciliation. The process of criminal trials, national or international, is no 
different. Utilizing justice as an element of conflict resolution is not as 
straightforward a process as might be assumed. International tribunals are less 
than perfect mechanisms for dealing with mass atrocities for a number of 
reasons: only a relatively small number of people can be tried, though even 
trying modest numbers of persons may contribute significantly to the 
reconciliation process if those tried are the planners and leading perpetrators of 
mass crimes as opposed to minor culprits; and trials are unavoidably lengthy 
because of the intricacies of judicial proceedings conducted in several languages. 
These trials also tend to be perfectionist in aspiration because of the need to 
respect due process and the accused’s right to a fair trial. All of this can tax the 
patience of victims and observers and raise questions about the true deterrent 
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effect of trials. . . . Yet what is the alternative? Do nothing and raise the spectre 
of self-help vigilante justice?”152 
As this case has shown, international trials may be imperfect, but not wholly 
problematic. However, as Rapp states: 
The hope of those of us involved in this process is for a future where there will 
no longer be impunity for war criminals, and where there will be something at 
the international level similar to the process in national justice systems. Of 
course, national systems are not perfect, as the courts never convict all the 
criminals or deter all crime. Yet a national system need not prosecute all crimes 
in order to have a deterrent effect. Prosecuting selected cases, particularly when 
dealing with actors attuned to the possible consequences of their conduct, can be 
very effective.”153 
Perhaps the world will arrive at a world free of war crimes someday; in the meantime, 
however, the international community can learn from the past and strive for better ways 
of preventing and responding to genocide. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Metahistory, Hayden White discusses four “modes of emplotment” for 
describing worldviews.154 Borrowing literary language from Northrop Frye, he discusses 
romantic, comic, tragic, and satirical frames for telling stories about human nature. 
Romance, he argues, emphasizes “the hero’s transcendence from the world of 
experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it . . . the triumph of good 
over evil, virtue over vice, light over darkness, and the ultimate transcendence of man 
over the world in which he was imprisoned by the Fall.”155 In Comedy, White explains, 
“hope is held out for the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of 
occasional reconciliations of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds.”156 
Tragedy focuses on “the nature of resignations of men into the conditions under which 
they must labor . . . [which] are asserted to be inalterable and eternal.”157 Finally, White 
describes Satire as “a drama dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a 
captive of the world rather than its master, and by the recognition that . . . human 
consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of overcoming definitively the 
dark force of death, which is man’s unremitting enemy.”158 White suggests that these 
four “modes of emplotment” extend beyond how we tell fiction stories to how we tell 
non-fiction stories. 
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To use White’s metaphors, I suggest that Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire 
can explain how we understand and theorize genocide. A romantic view of genocide is 
that espoused by those who argue “never again.” Those who hold this view imagine a 
peaceful world in which genocide is no longer a possibility. The criticism of this 
viewpoint, however, is that despite claims of “never again,” genocide has become a 
recurring phenomenon. Although it sounds very pleasant, a romantic view of genocide 
might be overly optimistic.  
A tragic, or even satirical, view of genocide is one similar to the ideas expressed 
by many international leaders in response to Rwanda. Specifically, Frank Wisner’s 
comment that “we can’t put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists”159 suggests that 
genocide will happen and there is little that people can do to prevent them. Indeed, given 
events in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere, there is reason to 
be skeptical. Tragic and satirical views of genocide, however, are pessimistic and, as I 
argued in my third chapter, short-sighted. 
I espouse a comic framework toward genocide here (an odd combination of 
words, indeed). This approach recognizes the reality of genocide but hopes that 
humanity will learn from previous mistakes. Although less optimistic than a romantic 
worldview, it acknowledges that some of the limitations that have hitherto interfered 
with genocide prevention may continue into the future. Furthermore, it avoids some of 
the traps from the less optimistic plots that have led to nonintervention and the 
consequences that accompany it. Consequently, it is “hope . . . by occasional 
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reconciliations of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds” that drives my 
analysis of the trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan 
Ngeze. 
First, in terms of morality and culpability for incitement, I argue that incitement 
to genocide is possible and should be a punishable offense. Understood as situational 
violence with malicious intent and vicarious action, the concept of incitement is a useful 
legal term that explains why both speakers and listeners are responsible for the final 
outcome. The prosecution at the ICTR presented abundant evidence that Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza, and Ngeze incited the Rwandan Hutu population. At the same time, the 
case against these three executives was so strong that it might set too high of a burden of 
proof for future cases. Consequently, lawyers, journalists and scholars can identify what 
constituted incitement in this case, but may need to adopt a contextual approach in the 
future. 
In terms of politics, I concur with Bill Clinton’s remarks in Kigali that the 
international community “must have global vigilance . . . never again must we be shy in 
the face of the evidence . . . [and] we must, as an international community, have the 
ability to act when genocide threatens.”160 In order for these words to mean anything, 
however, they must not fall upon deaf ears. It is easy to point fingers and place blame 
after something like genocide occurs; however, this game is only valuable insofar as the 
parties involved can reflect upon their (in)action and change their ways. In particular, 
two related lessons from Rwanda include the willingness to call genocide by its rightful 
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name and, more importantly, to accept the duty to act after doing so. The second lesson 
may be difficult for world leaders to accept, but, as Albright and Cohen and others have 
argued, the long-term costs (financial, political, and, most importantly, human) of denial 
and inaction outweigh the short-term costs of financial and military support.   
Finally, with regards to the trial itself and international law, I argue that the 
developing international legal system is an imperfect but nevertheless useful tool for 
reconciliation of a divided public. The “media trial” contained many strengths and 
weaknesses, but to render a pure judgment about its effectiveness is to miss important 
parts of the story. It successfully brought these three men to justice, offered closure to a 
dark chapter of history, and sent a message to those who wish to commit genocide and 
mass atrocities elsewhere; at the same time, it was slow, distant, and sometimes 
inconsiderate of the very public it aimed to help. A better question than whether the trial 
was “good” or “bad” might be whether it “worked.” To this question, I cautiously reply 
in the affirmative. At the same time, I argue that it was, as Moghalu says, an “imperfect 
mechanism,” but one that we can learn from and reform. Fortunately, a comic attitude 
toward this trial allows room to reflect upon the past and prepare for the future. 
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